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Plastic bags can weigh only 3 to 5 grams but carry several hundred times that weight. They are also relatively 
cheap to produce. Both characteristics made them the worldwide dominant choice for shopping. Nevertheless, 
improper disposal of used plastic bags causes significant negative impacts on the environment. For example, 
accumulated plastic debris in terrestrial ecosystems and open sea poses considerable risks to wildlife, which may 
suffer from choking, starvation, ingestion of micro-plastics and absorption of toxic chemicals (Barnes et al., 
2009).1 In addition, the accumulation of plastic bags and debris in shores negatively affects economic activities 
such as tourism, shipping and fishing. A “significant underestimate” of the external costs of the pollution of 
marine environments with plastic is US$ 13 billion per year (UNEP, 2014). Awareness of these impacts have 
increased globally, according to the current number of initiatives to reduce the consumption of plastics bags, at 
all government levels, around the world (see section 10.1, in the appendix, for a review of these initiatives). 
Despite its impressive number, evaluations of the effectiveness of these initiatives with a proper identification 
strategy are rather scarce. This is particularly true for the impact of levies.  
In this work, we evaluate the effect of different prices on the number of disposable plastic bags used by 
customers of a supermarket chain in Uruguay. To do so, we collect data on the total number of single-use plastic 
bags delivered or sold, by month, in all the 90 branches that this chain has across the country, before and after 
it implemented a staggered rollout of the prices to different cities. The data covers 25 months, from April 2017 
(a year before pricing the bags in the first branches) to April 2019 (a year after). To identify the effect of the 
prices, we use different strategies. We use several difference-in-difference methods to identify the effect of a 
price of UY$ 2 (approximately US$ 0.07 in April 2018, when it came into effect) and a price of UY$3 
(approximately US$ 0.10). To identify the effect of a UY$ 4 price, for which we do not have a control group, we 
use a simpler pre-post analysis. 
We find that prices of UY$ 2 and UY$ 3 per bag decreased the demand of single-use plastic bags in the 
range of 70% to 85%, with no clear difference between the two prices. Estimates are robust in magnitude and 
statistical significance to different methods of estimation, different specifications of the estimated equation and 
placebo tests. In particular, they are robust to the estimation of strategic anticipatory behavior by customers. In 
addition, using a pre-post analysis, we find that the price of UY$ 4 produced sizable additional drops in the 
demand for plastic bags, in all branches, independently of the previous level of the price. We estimate that this 
price may have decreased the overall demand by an additional 40%, on average. Finally, we do not find evidence 
consistent with a loss in sales being the mechanism behind this drop.  
There are only three rigorous evaluations of the impact of levies on the use of plastic bags. The first one 
is Jakovcevic et al. (2014). These authors evaluated the effect of a price of US$ 0.25 for “medium size” disposable 
plastic bags and a price of US$ 0.4 for “big bags” set by supermarkets in Buenos Aires, Argentina, effective 
October 9, 2012, on the proportion of interviewed customers using reusable bags. A second one is Homonoff 
(2018), who studies the impact of a levy of US$ 0.05 per single-use paper or plastic bag in Montgomery County, 
USA, effective January 1, 2012. Her objective was to compare the effect of the tax with that of a subsidy of the 
 
1 Plastic bags are particularly risky to sea turtles, as well as other 26 species of cetaceans (Moore, 2008). Concentrations of 
micro-plastics affects hatching, feeding and fleeing behavior and growth of larval fish at relevant levels (Lönnstedt and Eklöv, 
2016). 




same value that some stores had for each reusable bag that customers brought to the supermarket. Lastly, 
Homonoff et al. (2020) studied the effect of a tax of US$ 0.07 per unit of single-use paper or plastic bags, effective 
in the city of Chicago since February 1, 2017. Overall, these studies find that a modest price may considerably 
decrease the use of plastic bags. Nevertheless, they leave several important questions unanswered, several of 
which our work contributes to answer.  
One is the basic question of what is the effect of a price on the quantity of bags used, with respect to a 
situation of no regulation, beyond the first three months of implementation. Homonoff (2018) estimates the 
effect of a tax on the pooled demand for paper and plastic disposable bags, using a pre- and post-treatment 
period of three months.2 Homonoff et al. (2020) also estimate the effect of a tax on the pooled demand for 
paper, thin plastic and thick plastic disposable bags, and they do observe customers on treated and control units 
up to one year after the tax. Nevertheless, their pre-treatment reference period is either the last two months of 
a ban or a month in between the ban and the tax. Using a month in between a ban and a tax as the pre-treatment 
period, or using a pre-treatment period of only three months could bias the estimates. A month between a ban 
and a tax is a peculiar and short pre-treatment period that may not reflect properly the level of bags consumed 
in the absence of a tax or a ban. For example, because of the ban, customers may have acquired reusable bags, 
which they may continue to use in that month of no regulation. In addition, anticipation of the charge by 
customers may bias three-month pre- and post-treatment estimations. Customers may anticipate the tax simply 
because governments and stores inform them about it before the implementation date. For example, the city of 
Chicago announced the tax two months before its implementation (Homonoff et al., 2020). If customers behave 
strategically, they might increase the demand for costless bags before the implementation of the tax, to save 
money afterwards. Alternatively, they may buy reusable bags in advance. In such cases, a short pre-treatment 
period may bias the estimation. Nevertheless, anticipation may not be the only reason why short-run diff-in-diff 
estimations may produce different results than longer-run ones. Another reason may be that customers’ reaction 
to the tax may vary through time. For example, Homonoff (2018) finds evidence consistent with loss aversion in 
the behavior of customers facing a tax on plastic bags. Since customer´s reference price is zero, a (relatively 
small) tax would feel like a loss, explaining why customers react more to a tax than to a subsidy. Although there 
is not much evidence about how subjects determine their reference points (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006), Tversky 
and Kahneman (1991) argue that these may be influenced by norms or social comparisons. Therefore, if paying 
for the bags becomes a norm and/or “everybody” is using reusable bags for shopping after a period, the 
reference point may change, possibly decreasing the effect of a price on the use of plastic bags. Possible 
anticipation and loss-aversion effects are important reasons why the lack of longer-run policy evaluations of the 
effect of a tax on plastic bags is an important gap in our knowledge. We contribute to filling this gap by being the 
first to quantify the effect of a price, with respect to a situation of no regulation, over a two-year time window 
(a pre-treatment and a post-treatment period of one year). This allows us both to factor in a possible 
“anticipation” behavior by the part of the customers in the months before the implementation of the price and 
to capture possible variations in the effect during the first year. In addition, a longer pre-treatment period with 
no regulation reflects more accurately the pre-treatment level of consumption of bags.  
 
2 Using scanner data from a supermarket chain, Homonoff (2018) also tracks the evolution of disposable bag use from the 
first month of implementation of the tax up to 2.5 years in DC and six months in Montgomery County. She observes that 
the drop in the proportion of transactions that included at least one disposable bag after the tax decreased by approximately 
15% in the two sites, and remained at this lower level for the observed period. Nevertheless, this longer-term analysis does 
not include a control or a pre-tax period.  




Another unanswered question is what is the effect of a price on the quantity of plastic bags used outside 
the US. Jakovcevic et al. (2014) is the only study of the three above that takes place in a non-US city. Nevertheless, 
the authors do not measure the number of plastic bags used by customers. Instead, they classified interviewed 
customers into three categorical groups: (a) those using only plastic bags, (b) those using only reusable bags and 
(c) mixed customers. The lack of a rigorous study estimating the effect of a price on the quantity of plastic bags 
used outside the areas of the city of Chicago and Montgomery County is an important gap in the literature. As is 
the case with any good that is privately produced and sold in a market, determinants of plastic bags consumption 
include income, preferences, relative prices, and regulations. Income level determines the size of the choice set 
and the willingness to pay for plastic bags, directly. It also affects the willingness to pay for plastic bags indirectly, 
by determining, for example, whether the consumer has a car and where does it live, which determines grocery 
patterns, such as number of trips to the supermarket per month. Preferences for goods and the environment, 
formed by individual traits, education, and culture, are another determinant of customers´ demand for plastic 
bags. Relatedly, in the case of formerly free plastic bags, apart from the issue of relative prices, there is the issue 
of zero-prices. As documented by Shampanier et al. (2007), people consume free goods in excess of what a 
standard cost-benefit analysis would predict. The reason behind this seems to be that people experience an 
additional affection for free goods and services. All these factors may differ between the US and the rest of the 
world, where initiatives to reduce the use of single–use plastic bags are becoming ubiquitous. In particular, 
factors that affect the demand for plastic bags may differ considerably between the US and less developed 
countries, which play a significant role in worldwide plastic pollution. For these reasons, assessing the external 
validity of quantitative results obtained in a limited number of US cities remains a crucial policy matter because 
it may inform policy makers of the effectiveness of a price when these factors vary. Our work, which takes place 
in Uruguay, contributes to start filling this gap by providing the first evaluation of the effect of a price on single-
use plastic bags outside the US that uses a counterfactual control group and actual quantitative data on bags 
consumption. 
An important determinant of the choice set of plastic-bag consumers is the scope of the regulation. 
Incomplete regulation occurs when the regulation applies only to a subset of firms, products or jurisdictions. 
Reasons behind the existence of incomplete regulation could be political, technical, related to the capacity of 
regulators or the cost of implementing a complete regulation. Homonoff et al. (2020) stresses the importance of 
complete regulation, citing the introduction of thicker free bags in response to fees for thin plastic bags. Taylor 
(2019) finds that sales of trash bag increase with fees on single-use plastic bags. This “bag leakage” can certainly 
occur in less developed countries also, where incomplete regulation is common due to the presence of large 
informal sectors, more unsatisfied basic needs and less institutional capacity. Moreover, prices could play a more 
key role in these countries, where a higher mismanagement of waste (Jambeck et al. 2015) and little recycling 
make reducing consumption a crucial step to reduce plastic pollution. Nevertheless, the literature does not 
inform policy makers and non-governmental organizations on the conditions under which incomplete pricing 
(that is, when the price is not homogeneously distributed across jurisdictions, stores or type of bags) may still be 
effective. In contrast, our work informs policy makers about certain conditions under which incomplete 
regulation may achieve good results.3 Effectively, the supermarket from which we obtain the data on prices and 
quantities of bags used was frequently the only store in town pricing single-use plastic bags. This had to do with 
the fact that the pricing initiative in our setting is private, and as such, optional. This unique setting allows our 
 
3 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 




study to inform policy makers and non-governmental organizations on the effects of selectively targeting a large, 
organized, easy-to-monitor sector like supermarkets when complete implementation is out of reach. 
Another issue that the literature has not solved yet is whether the magnitude of the bag price matters 
or not. When regulating plastic bags used, a regulator can essentially use a quantity instrument (like a ban) or a 
price instrument (like a tax). Regulators worldwide have used both (see section 10.1, in the appendix). Although 
both instruments will produce the same result under perfect information, a regulator frequently does not have 
enough information on the marginal benefits and costs of regulating plastic bags when deciding among them. 
Under these circumstances, setting a price for plastic bags could result in undesired results. These undesired 
results translate into welfare losses in the form of pollution damages from the excessive use of plastic bags (when 
the price is set too low) or in the form of forgone benefits associated with shopping with single-use plastic bags 
(when the price is set too high).4 As pointed out by Weitzman (1974) in his seminal article, whether the welfares 
losses associated with setting a price are lower or higher than directly setting the desired quantity depends on 
the relative slopes of the marginal benefits and marginal damages involved in the use of plastic bags. Knowing 
how consumers react to different prices gives policy makers valuable information in this respect, information 
that may help them to set the right price (or to decide to regulate the quantity of bags used, instead). The 
literature does not provide policy makers with this information. In this paper, we contribute to start filling this 
gap by estimating the effect of three different prices on the demand for single-use plastic bags. These prices 
represent a higher variation than that observed in the two previous separate studies that measure the impact of 
a price on the number of bags used.  
Finally, this paper uses data on all bags distributed by the supermarket stores. Previous evaluations relied 
on survey or observational data based on a sample of customers. In this sense, our study allows for a more exact 
estimate of the overall effect of a price on the demand of single-use plastic bags.  
We organize the paper as follows. In section 2, we provide a review of the empirical literature on the 
effect of prices and levies on the use of plastic bags. In section 3, we describe the institutional context in which 
the intervention took place. In section 4, we describe the data. In section 5, we provide our estimation of the 
average effect, when pooling the data across branches and months. In section 6, we estimate wave-specific 
treatment effects. In section 7, we present some robustness checks. Finally, we discuss our results and conclude 
in section 8. 
2 Literature review 
As noted in the introduction, rigorous evaluations of the effect of taxes or levies to limit the level of consumption 
of plastic bags are scarce. Moreover, several suffer from important methodological shortcomings. Some are 
simple “pre-post” evaluations, without a control group. The studies of the effect of levies on plastic bag programs 
in Ireland by Convery et al. (2007), in South Africa by Dikgang et al. (2012a and 2012b), in China by He (2012) and 
in Portugal by Martinho et al. (2017) are examples of this kind of studies. Other studies rely on self-reported 
categorical quantitative data collected in non-face-to-face surveys. Rivers et al. (2017) is one of them. These 
authors use data from a periodical household survey in Canada, before and after a disposable bag levy of C$ 0.05 
in Toronto. Poortinga et al. (2013) is another example, but unlike Rivers et al., they have a control group. These 
 
4 Ironically, the latter case could also produce environmental damages from the use of unwanted substitutes. 




authors found that a five pence charge for each single-use bag introduced in Wales on October 1, 2011, increased 
the proportion of respondents declaring to bring their own bag on their last visit to the supermarket.  
As mentioned above, there are only three rigorous (i.e.: with a control group) evaluations of the impact 
of a levy on the use of disposable bags. The first one is Jakovcevic et al. (2014). These authors interviewed a 
sample of 457 customers in supermarkets in the city of Buenos Aires and in the Great Buenos Aires (outside the 
city), before and after supermarkets in the former, but not in the latter, put a price on disposable plastic bags. 
The price was the response of the supermarkets to a provision of the environmental protection office of the 
government of the city of Buenos Aires that established that the supermarkets in the city “would only be allowed 
to deliver larger and stronger plastic bags” (Jakovcevic et al. (2014), p. 374). Because the provision implied higher 
costs to the supermarkets, these decided to put a price of US$ 0.25 for “medium size bags” and US$ 0.4 for “big 
size bags”. The authors conducted the survey in four points in time. The customers from Great Buenos Aires 
acted as the control group at all points in time. Big supermarkets in the city of Buenos Aires started charging the 
bags in October 9, 2012. Supermarkets owned by Chinese residents started charging the bags on December 10. 
As a result, customers from the latter act as an additional control group in the first three waves of the survey. 
Nevertheless, the authors do not measure the number of plastic bags used by customers in their surveys. Instead, 
they classified interviewed customers in three categorical groups: (a) those using only plastic bags, (b) those 
using only reusable bags and (c) mixed customers. They observed that the charge steadily increased the use of 
reusable-bags.  
Unlike Jakovcevic et al. (2014), Homonoff et al. (2020) and Homonoff (2018) estimate the impact of a 
levy on the quantity demanded of both paper and plastic single-use bags, by supermarkets customers. Homonoff 
et al. (2020) studied the effect of a US$ 0.07 tax on paper and plastic bags of all thicknesses, effective in the city 
of Chicago since February 1, 2017. The authors interviewed 24,002 customers at large chain grocery stores inside 
the city of Chicago and outside the city (where there was no tax on disposable bags), before and after the tax. 
Interviews took place at four different points in time, between November 2016 and March 2018. This sample 
period spans three policy regimes: (a) a ban on plastic bags less than 2.25 mils thick, (b) a month of no regulation 
and (c) a tax on paper and plastic bags of all thicknesses. In these interviews, they gathered information on the 
number and type of bags used by customers per trip. This data enables them to perform a difference-in-
difference analysis. On the extensive margin, the tax decreased the likelihood of a consumer using any positive 
number of disposable bags (paper or plastic, of any thickness) by 33 percentage points in the first two months 
(from an average percentage of 82 points before the tax) relative to during the ban. On the intensive margin, the 
tax decreased the average number of disposable bags used by almost one bag per trip on average in the first two 
months (from an average of 2.5 bags per trip in the month of no regulation before the tax). An important finding 
of this study is that the tax exhibited a decreasing effect over the first year of implementation. A year later, the 
proportion of customers using disposable bags was 24.8 percentage points lower than in the ban, instead of 33, 
and it did not exhibit an effect statistically different from zero in the third and fourth quarter of implementation. 
This fading effect in the number of bags used may be the result of a substitution away from thinner to thicker 
bags by Chicago shoppers, as the tax is the same for all disposable bags, but thicker bags can carry more goods. 
Although authors estimate that the Chicago tax decreased the total amount of plastic used, they do not provide 
an estimation of the effect of the tax on the number of thin disposable bags used by shoppers during the first 
year of implementation.  




In an earlier work, Homonoff (2018) studies the impact of a US$ 0.05 levy on disposable paper and plastic 
bags in Montgomery County, USA. Unlike Chicago, some stores in Montgomery County had also a US$ 0.05 
subsidy for each reusable bag that customers brought to the supermarket. Homonoff´s (2018) main objective 
was to compare the effect of the tax on disposable bags (paper or plastic) with that of the bonus on the use of 
reusable bags. The author used observational data, with an identical collection strategy as that described above 
for Chicago. Using a difference-in-difference strategy, she found that the proportion of customers using at least 
one disposable (paper or plastic) in Montgomery County before the tax was 82% and the tax decreased this 
proportion by 42 percentage points. In addition, the tax increased the proportion of customers using al least one 
reusable bag by 32.7 percentage points and the proportion of customers using no bag at all by 11 points. On the 
intensive margin, she observed that the tax decreased the number of bags used by bag users by 0.22 bags per 
trip (a decrease of 8%). It also increased the number of reusable bags by 0.15 bags (an increase of 9%). Combining 
the extensive and the intensive margin, she found that the tax decreased the number of disposable (paper or 
plastic) by just over one bag per trip. Finally, using cross-sectional variation across stores, she found that 
customers in stores that offered a bonus were as likely to use a disposable bag as those in stores that did not.  
Other rigorous studies in the literature evaluate the impact of a ban, instead of a levy, on the demand for 
disposable carryout thin-plastic bags and other outcomes. Taylor and Villas-Boas (2016) evaluate the impact of 
a policy effective January 1, 2014, in the neighboring California cities of El Cerrito, Richmond and San Pablo. This 
policy implemented a ban on single-use thin plastic bags coupled with a mandatory provision by which retail 
stores must charge at least US$ 0.05 for each single-use paper or any other reusable bag provided to customers 
(e.g.: thick-plastic). The authors wanted, first, to evaluate whether these twin measures had the intended effects 
on the types of bags used and, second, to compare its effectiveness with the policy of only taxing disposable bags 
with a five-cent levy. To do this, Taylor and Villas-Boas recorded information on the number and type of bags 
used and other variables, from a sample of customers they observed during checkout at a set of stores in these 
cities and the control cities of Berkeley and Concord. Berkeley had implemented a ban on plastic bags and a 
minimum price of 10 cents for paper bags. In contrast, no regulation was in place in Concord. In both cases, there 
was no bag policy change during the sample period. Customers were observed in four visits of 1-2 hours each, in 
every store in the sample, in November 2013 and in December 2013, before the Richmond policy went into 
effect. In the post-treatment period, the authors observed the customers in 4 to 6 visits that took place in January 
2014 and in February 2014. They also collected follow-up data in March and April 2014. Finally, to compare their 
results with the policy of only taxing plastic and paper bags five cents, they used the results in Homonoff (2018). 
Using a difference-in-difference strategy, they find that the policy of banning thin plastic bags coupled with a 
mandatory price on paper and thick-plastic bags had a similar positive effect on the proportion of customers 
using reusable bags. It also had a similar negative effect in the proportion of customers using disposable (paper 
or plastic) bags. However, the twin measures changed the proportion of plastic and paper disposable bags used. 
The proportion of customers using plastic bags decreased between 80 and 90%, while the proportion of 
customers using paper bags increased 46%. The authors also find that this increase in the usage of paper bags 
was significantly lower (10%) in a discount chain charging 10 cents (instead of five cents) for paper bags and 
offering 15-cent reusable thick-plastic bags.  
Finally, Taylor (2019 and 2020) goes beyond the evaluation of the impact of a ban on the quantity of 
disposable carryout bags used, providing the first contributions towards a full welfare evaluation of this policy. 
A ban or a price on single-use shopping bags may decrease external, collection and final disposal costs. 




Nevertheless, on the negative side, Taylor (2020) found that they might also increase the time customers spent 
at check out. Using observational and cashier scanner data from a supermarket chain, she found that the 
California ban on single-used plastic bags (coupled with a tax on paper and thicker, reusable plastic bags) 
increased 3.1% the checking out time at supermarkets. Using the same scanner data plus observational data at 
checkout points, Taylor (2019) estimated that the ban on plastic bags in California increased trash bag purchases 
of small, medium and tall sizes by 79%, 50% and 6%, respectively. Our data does not allow us to estimate these 
important additional effects. Nevertheless, we think that they may well may be at play in Uruguay.  
As noted in the introduction, these empirical works leave several gaps in our knowledge. One is the lack of 
a rigorous estimation of the effect of a price on the quantity of plastic bags used, with respect to a situation of 
no regulation, using a pre-treatment period long enough to consider anticipation effects. Another one is the lack 
of a rigorous quantitative estimation outside the US. In addition, this literature does not inform policy makers 
and non-governmental organizations on the conditions under which incomplete pricing (that is, when the price 
is not homogeneously distributed across jurisdictions, stores or type of bags) may still be effective. Finally, this 
literature has not solved yet whether the magnitude of the bag price matters or not. Our work contributes to 
start filling these gaps.  
3 Intervention context 
The supermarket chain from which we obtain the data priced the plastic bags voluntarily. It did so firstly in one 
city (Salto), adhering to a private initiative to price plastic bags pushed by the city chamber of commerce. After 
six months, it started rolling out the pricing to other cities across the country. In this section, we present the 
context of these decisions and we provide an account of the chain of events.  
3.1 A private citywide initiative to price plastic bags 
In July 2016, the Uruguayan government presented a bill to the Senate to regulate the production, distribution 
and consumption of plastic bags.5 This bill included an article establishing a mandatory minimum price for 
carryout plastic bags. According to the explanatory notes, the bill was the result of a conversation process lead 
by the Ministry of the Environment (XLVIIIa Legislatura, 2017). Several public and private institutions participated 
in this process, such as the municipal governments of the metropolitan area of Montevideo (the capital city of 
Uruguay) and representatives of associations of the industry, recyclers, and the retail sector. As we comment 
below, the parliament approved the final version of the law in August 2018 (Law # 19655). Nevertheless, eight 
months before, on December 6, 2017, the Senate had already approved, and passed to the House of 
Representatives, a revised version of the bill. Around the same days, the Industrial and Commercial Center of the 
city of Salto (the union of the city local businesses; equivalent to a U.S. city chamber of commerce) launched a 
 
5 Unlike the US, paper bags are not available in Uruguayan supermarkets. 




campaign to decrease the use of plastic bags in that city.6 The campaign´s main proposal was a voluntary price 
for disposable plastic bags.7  
Because the price was voluntary, the authorities of the Commercial Center of Salto spent the following 
months convincing stores to agree to implement such a price. By the end of December 2017, the authorities of 
the center thought they had convinced a number of stores sufficient to inform the public about the imminent 
future pricing of the bags. Adhered stores put flyers in their doors saying that the second plastic bag was going 
to be charged UY$ 2 (2 Uruguayan pesos; around 7 cents of US dollar), starting on January 1 2018. Nevertheless, 
this never took place. During January 2018, the measure evolved to the following: a price of UY$ 2 for the 
common single-use plastic bags and UY$ 3 (around US$ 0.1) for “big bags” (Centro Comercial e Industrial de Salto, 
2018). The center did not propose any size or characteristic for the bags and the stores did not coordinate on 
this issue. Therefore, sizes may have differed between stores. During the sample period, the size of the 
disposable, thin-plastic bags, delivered for free by the supermarket from which we collect the data was 40*50 
cm. The size of the disposable, thin-plastic bags sold was 45 * 60 cm.8 
Clogging sewers, consuming space in a landfill close to its capacity and demanding cleaning resources, 
improperly disposed plastic bags were also a problem for the municipal government. As a result, on February 21, 
2018 it formally adhered to the campaign (Resolution 074/18, Intendencia de Salto, 2018). After the municipal 
government adhered to it, the campaign reached full swing. More stores followed. One of these was the 
supermarket chain from which we obtain the data. According to conversations with officials from the Commercial 
Center of Salto, its adherence was essential for the implementation of the price because of this supermarket´s 
share of the city grocery market, estimated to be between 40% and 50%.9 During those same weeks, the 
municipal government and the commercial center launched a media campaign on TV, radio and internet, 
informing citizens that the price would be effective by April 2, 2018 (Industrial and Commercial Center of Salto, 
e-mail communication, March 13, 2020). Adhered stores displayed the campaign sign at their entrance.10  
As announced, the adhered stores started pricing the bags in April 2, 2018, making Salto the first city in 
Uruguay to price single used plastic bags. Since the pricing was optional, a question that arises naturally is how 
many stores in Salto adhered to the measure? In other words, how incomplete was the implementation of the 
price. In September 2018, the Commercial Center of Salto conducted a survey to answer this question. According 
 
6 With a population of 105,000, the city of Salto is the second most populated city of Uruguay, where roughly 3.5 million 
people live. 
7 We have mixed evidence on whether the pricing initiative in Salto was the result of the previous conversation that led to 
the bill or not. In April 2018, the manager of Salto Chamber of Commerce declared in the press that their “… initiative came 
before the bill was created. If approved [the bill], much better, and if our initiative helps to achieve the other half sanction 
[in the House of Representatives], it would be spectacular.” (El Observador, 06 April 2018). On the other hand, according to 
the director of the national environment directorate at that time, although it did help in the approval of the bill and the 
following regulation, Salto´s initiative was born from the national conversation preceding the bill (Telephone conversation, 
October 11, 2020). 
8 Given that the priced bag is somewhat larger that the non-priced bag, all else equal, our evaluation probably provides a 
lower estimation than it would provide an evaluation of the effect of a price for a bag of the same size. This is remarkable, 
given the size of the effect that we find and reinforces our conclusions.  
9 There were four supermarket chains in Salto at that time. Three of them were local chains. The fourth was the national 
chain from which we collect the data. 
10 The sign informed readers that “from 04/02/18, standard T-shirt type plastic bags will have a cost of UY$ 2 (tax incl.), and 
UY$ 3 the bigger ones”. Figure A.1 in the Appendix (section 10.2), shows a picture of the sign. 




to this survey, there were around 80 stores charging bags (90% of which since day one). These represented all 
the supermarkets, 60% of grocery stores, 50% of markets, 40% of bakeries and 35% of butcher shops (Manager 
of Industrial and Commercial Center of Salto, e-mail communication, July 2, 2020). Because all the supermarkets 
in the city adopted the price, the percentage of sales subject to the charge of bags may be larger than the 
percentages of businesses. 
As with any private or public measure, compliance to it is a critical issue. Bharadwaj et al. (2019), for 
example, found that the effectiveness of the plastic bag bans in selected municipalities in Nepal critically 
depended on its enforcement and sanctioning system. In Salto, there is anecdotal evidence that during the first 
days some supermarkets put boxes near cashiers or gave some angry customers a number of bags free of charge 
(Diario El Pueblo, 2018). More formally, the supermarket chain from which we obtain the data gave one reusable 
bag to customers with a loyalty card during the period of twenty days before starting to price the bags. Customers 
without a loyalty card in this supermarket could also get a reusable bag by spending more than UY$ 1,500 (Diario 
El Pueblo, 2018). The biggest local supermarket also gave bags free of charge to its customers. The rest of the 
stores did not follow suit.  
These type of “compensation” measures by retailers are something to expect to see during the first days 
of interventions such as this. Certainly, depending on their magnitude, this implementation “noises” may affect 
the estimation of the impact of the price in the very short run. Nevertheless, these measures were in place in 
the days or weeks that precede or followed the implementation date. After those first days, the supermarkets 
stop giving bags free of charge. Therefore, this “noise” should fade away in longer-run estimations, such as the 
ones we present here.  
3.2 The supermarket chain rollout of the price to other cities 
Six months after pricing the bags in Salto, the central headquarters of the supermarket chain decided to start a 
staggered rollout of the price across branches in other towns and cities. In October 2018, it started to charge $2 
the plastic bags in 11 additional branches located in six other cities and towns.11 (See Figure 1, panel (a)). In 
December 2018, it started to charge the bags UY$ 3 in three branches located in two cities, La Paz and Las Piedras 
(See Figure 1, panel (b)). The reason for pricing the bags UY$ 3 in these two towns instead of UY$ 2 was that the 
price in these two towns was the result of an agreement among all supermarkets in these towns. In the rest of 
the cities where the supermarket rolled out the pricing of the bags, it was the only one doing it and it charged 
the bags UY$ 2. A fourth wave occurred a month later, in January 2019. In this wave, the supermarket added 12 
branches in seven cities (See Figure 1, panel (c)).12 Lastly, it added one more branch in the city of San José in 




11 One branch in the cities of Florida, Fray Bentos, Rosario and Young, two branches in the city of Durazno and five branches 
in the city of Paysandú.  
12 Four branches in the city of Tacuarembó, two in Mercedes, two in Trinidad and one in Artigas, Carmelo, Colonia and Juan 
Lacaze.  












(c) January 2019: 12 branches located in 7 cities 
 
 




 Branch previously pricing the bags                      Branch that started to price the bags in each wave 
 
  FIGURE 1: SUPERMARKET CHAIN ROLLOUT OF THE PRICING OF PLASTIC BAGS ACROSS URUGUAYAN CITIES 
Notes: The figure shows the location of each treated branch across the country. Each pin corresponds to a branch. The red line, 
running from South to North, is Route 5. In addition to the branches marked on the map, the supermarket chain has another 56 branches, 
located in 11 cities, covering the 19 departments of the country. Together with the marked branches, these other branches began to 
charge UY$ 4 each bag in April 2019, a move agreed upon by all supermarkets in the country, after the approval of a law that would 
impose such a minimum price for bags in June 2019. 
 
It is important to note that the supermarket chain did not implement the policy of giving one reusable 
bag free of charge to loyal customers in all the cities in which it priced the bags, as it did in Salto. According to a 




former manager of the supermarket that worked in the rollout (personal communication, October 9, 2020), the 
supermarket had imported 60,000 reusable bags before starting pricing the bags. According to the same source, 
the number of bags given free of charge to loyal customers in Salto must have been between 10,000 and 20,000. 
Notwithstanding, only “a few” of the remaining bags were given free of charge to customers in some of the cities 
that comprised the second wave. Instead, both in Salto and the cities of the second wave, the supermarket put 
them on sale. 
 
 
FIGURE 2: TIMELINE OF THE PRICE ROLLOUT 
Notes: The figure summarizes information about the six waves of the pricing rollout across 30 branches located in 17 cities in Uruguay. 
The supermarket chain also has 56 untreated branches, located in 11 different cities. These branches didn´t charge for the bags until April 
2019. These 56 branches will serve as controls in some analyzes. In April 2019, all branches began to charge UY$ 4, in a national agreement 
between all supermarkets, after the approval of a law that would impose such a minimum price for bags in June 2019.  
As commented above, in August 2018, the Uruguayan parliament approved the Law # 19655. This law 
established (a) a national ban on non-biodegradable or non-compostable bags and (b) a national minimum price 
of UY$ 4 for the permitted plastic bags. The law´s regulatory decree established that the prohibition to import 
or manufacture non-compostable or non-biodegradable bags began on March 1, 2019 and that the national 
minimum price began on June 30, 2019 (Art. 19, Decree # 3/019). That is, after March 1, 2019, four months 
before being obliged to price the new compostable bags, the stores in Uruguay could still distribute non-
biodegradable bags free of charge. Nevertheless, they risked running out of these bags and having to pay more 
for the compostable bags, as they could only rely on their stocks or the stocks of importers or manufacturers (El 
País, 2019). Faced with this risk, and an opportunity to profit out of the soon-to-be-banned plastic bags, the 
association of supermarkets and others stores decided to start pricing the (non-biodegradable) bags UY$ 4 on 
April 1, 2019 (El Observador, 2019).  
The agreement between all the supermarkets in the country to price common plastic bags UY$ 4 in all 
branches nationwide, naturally marked the end of the staggered rollout of the supermarket chain. Consequently, 
it also marked the end of the natural experiment and our sample period. Finally, on June 30, 2019, the national 
ban on non-biodegradable or non – compostable bags and the UY$ 4 price for the permitted bags took effect, as 
established in the law. Since this date, carryout disposable plastic bags in Uruguay are compostable or 
biodegradable and have a minimum price of UY$ 4 (adjusted by inflation).  




Figure 3 shows the value of the price of plastic bags in the supermarket chain through time, by rollout 
wave (except the last one, of only one branch). At the end of the time line (April 2019), all branches end up selling 
bags at UY$ 4. This gives us three different price increases (from UY$ 0 to UY$ 4 in 56 branches, from UY$ 2 to 
UY$ 4 in 26 branches and from UY$ 3 to UY$ 4 in three branches), in addition to the price increases from the 
rollout. As explained below, we exploit the staggered rollout to estimate the effect of a price of UY$ 2 and UY$ 
3 on the demand for plastic bags with two different identification strategies: differences-in-differences OLS 
regressions and synthetic control methods. We also analyze the effect of the UY$ 4 price, using a simpler “pre-
post” strategy.  
 
FIGURE 3: TIME LINE OF THE ROLLOUT AND VALUE OF PRICES FOR PLASTIC BAGS IN THE SUPERMARKET CHAIN 
Notes: The figure plots the time evolution of the price of the plastic bags in the supermarket chain, by rollout wave. Prices are 
expressed in Uruguayan pesos (UY$). For ease of viewing, we omitted a branch that began charging UY$ 2 in February 2019. Nevertheless, 
this branch is included in all econometric analyzes. In April 2019, Uruguayans supermarkets agreed to price the bags UY$4, across the 
country. 
4 Data 
Our dataset is comprised of two subsets of data. One is the subset of variables that we obtain from the 
supermarket chain, comprised by the monthly number of bags delivered or sold by each branch, the level of the 
prices and the location of the branches. The other subset of data is comprised of variables measuring socio-
demographic characteristics of the city or towns where the branches are located. These data come from several 
sources. We first describe the supermarket data, in the following paragraphs, and then the socio-demographic 
data.  
As commented above, we collected data on the total number of single-use plastic bags delivered by the 
90 branches of the aforementioned supermarket chain, by month, between April 2017 (twelve months before 
they started pricing the bags in Salto) and April 2019 (the month in which all supermarkets in Uruguay started to 
price the bags). This supermarket chain is a discount store chain, with an explicit marketing strategy based on 




low prices. Its 90 branches spread over 28 cities and towns of Uruguay. It is the only supermarket chain with such 
a national presence.  
When the observation belongs to a branch that did not charge the bags during the entire sample period, 
or to a month before the date in which the branch started to charge them, the number of “delivered” bags is the 
number of bags given out free of charge. The number is the result of the difference in monthly stocks of plastic 
bags in that branch. When the month-branch observation corresponds to a branch and month during which the 
bags had a price, the number of bags “delivered” corresponds to the number of bags sold in that branch during 
that month, according to cashier data.  
The second sub set of data consists of information from four sources. The national Competition Defense 
Commission provided data on the location, surface and number of registers of 460 stores throughout the 
country. The government is currently building this database, to have historical data for future litigations under 
the antimonopoly law. Stores with two or more branches, or with a single branch with three or more registers, 
are obliged to report. With this data, we construct different measures of market share for the supermarket chain 
that we study. The next two data sources are the last national Census (2011) and the Continuous Household 
Surveys (Encuesta Continua de Hogares, 2016-2019). We use data from these sources to control for 
sociodemographic differences across the cities where the supermarket chain operates. Finally, the last source is 
geodata from the OpenStreetMap project, where we collected other characteristics of the cities (mainly the 
number of other shops). 
Our final database is an (unbalanced) monthly panel with 2,161 observations. It consists of the 90 
branches of the supermarket chain, located in 28 cities, across the 19 departments of Uruguay, during 25 
months.13 Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of our database. 
  
 
13 We have missing information on bag consumption in four branch-month observations. Additionally, four branches went 
out of business during 2017 (before the first wave of the experiment). 




TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
Variable mean sd min max 
Supermarket chain data     
     Bags delivered (free) by month (000) 70.52 49.20 -4.00 395.00 
     Bags sold by month (000) 22.22 13.05 1.82 59.79 
     Price 0.31 0.92 0 4 
        Price = 0 0.89 0.31 0 1 
        Price = 2 0.06 0.25 0 1 
        Price = 3 0.01 0.07 0 1 
        Price = 4 0.04 0.20 0 1 
     Treated April 2018 0.03 0.18 0 1 
     Treated October 2018 0.13 0.33 0 1 
     Treated December 2018 0.03 0.18 0 1 
     Treated January 2019 0.14 0.35 0 1 
     Other branches 0.67 0 0 0 
     Market share in city     
by area of stores (m2) 0.34 0.31 0.07 1 
by number of stores 0.33 0.26 0.06 1 
by number of registers 0.38 0.29 0.1 1 
     Number of stores in city 23.1 20.92 1 44 
     Largest store in town belongs to chain 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Cities data     
     Western city 0.88 0.33 0 1 
     Number of supermarkets in city 130.45 124.56 1 255 
     Total supermarkets area (m2) 89184 84098 642 173221 
     Cash registers in city 765.65 722.83 6 1488 
     Population 672669 626085 10085 1298649 
     Female (%) 0.53 0.01 0.5 0.54 
     Age 36.57 1.36 33.47 39.39 
     Children (%) 0.20 0.02 0.18 0.24 
     Married (%) 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.09 
     Retired (%) 0.20 0.02 0.13 0.27 
     Low education level (%) 0.54 0.09 0.37 0.7 
     Occupied (%) 0.60 0.02 0.56 0.69 
     Unemployed (%) 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.06 
     Income (UY$ 2019) 66583 13734 32898 93939 
     Below poverty line 0.06 0.03 0 0.2 
  




TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (CONT.) 
Variable mean sd min max 
Cities data, excluding Montevideo     
     Supermarkets (#) 5.37 5.06 0 34 
     Convencience Stores (#) 4.77 7.12 0 37 
     Schools (#) 9.20 7.57 1 39 
     Gas Stations (#) 5.75 2.87 2 13 
     Pharmacies (#) 3.72 4.49 0 28 
     Banks (#) 3.58 2.04 0 8 
     Other amenities (#) 117.02 155.83 4 966 
Notes: The table presents descriptive statistics for the entire database. We constructed this database using information from 
five sources. The first source is the supermarket chain, from which we obtain information on bags delivered or sold by every branch in 
every month, and the corresponding prices. The second source is the Competition Defense Commission database, from which we obtain 
information to calculate the market share of the supermarket in each city. The third source is the Census from 2011, from which we obtain 
information on the sociodemographic characteristics in each city (population, unemployment rate, etc.). The fourth source is the 
Continuous Household Survey (2016-2019), from which we obtain information on monthly income and poverty in each city; and. The fifth 
source is the OpenStreetMap project, from which we obtain additional information on the cities, excluding Montevideo. Western city is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one for those cities that are located on or west of Route 5. The first line of the table shows the 
average monthly number of bags delivered free of charge, while the second line shows the average monthly number of bags sold by a 
branch that is pricing thee bags. OpenStreetMap defines a supermarket as a large store with groceries and other items, and a convenience 
store as small local shop carrying a small subset of the items one would find in a supermarket. “Other amenities” summarizes 
approximately 200 types of additional amenities in the database, such as churches, hotels, parking lots, bakeries, ATMs, fast food stores, 
car repair shops, hospitals, butcher shops, currency exchange houses, police stations, hairdressers, clinics, etc. The total number of 
observations from this (unbalanced) monthly panel is 2,161. The data period for bags consumption ranges from April 2017 to April 2019. 
Treated branches charged a price of UY$ 2, UY$ 3, before April 2019 when all branches charged a price of UY$ 4.  
 
Our series of delivered bags is comprised of month-branch observations in which bags were given free 
of charge to customers and months in which these were sold. In the case of the former, the average number 
single-use plastic bags delivered by a branch in a month was 70,520. When charging the bags (UY$ 2, 3 or 4), the 
average number of bags sold by a branch in a month was 22,200. The standard deviation of the number of bags 
delivered for free is considerable. The largest branch delivered 230,740 bags for free in an average month and 
395,000 bags in the busiest month. The smallest branch delivered, on average, 17,670 bags per month to his 
customers. The minimum value of -4 thousand bags in the series of bags delivered for free deserves a 
clarification. The number has to do with the counting method. In the case of the number of bags sold per month, 
the counting is automatic, since the data comes from registers. Nevertheless, in the case of the bags delivered 
for free, the counting method is based on the difference in monthly stocks. This method is costlier in terms of 
human resources. Therefore, counting stocks may suffer from delays when the opportunity cost of employees 
peaks. In months in which employees did not count the final stock, the information on delivered bags is the sum 
of the stock at the beginning of that month plus the replenishment. At the end of the following month, employees 
adjust the initial stock to make the numbers add up to the number of bags delivered in the two months. Although 
this situation is not ideal, it is important to note that the delays in counting were rather the exception than the 
norm. In fact, the supermarket chain informed us that this problem occurred only in December 2017 in some 
branches. They also informed us that these branches adjusted their stocks in January 2018 (e-mail 
communication, November 2018). Reassuringly, we only have two observations with a negative number of bags 
delivered by a branch in a month. In both cases, this occurs after a month in which the number of bags 




“delivered” was significantly above the average, which is consistent with the hypothesis that they did not count 
the stock of bags at the end of that month. In any case, because the number of bags delivered in the two-month 
period involved is correct, we do not have a consistent measurement error. Only in the monthly level of such 
pair of months. However, we acknowledge that counting delivered bags based on the difference in monthly 
stocks may therefore add some variation to the series. For this reason, we use a smoother three-month moving 
average series of total bag consumption in some figures. We also perform some of the analyses using this series, 
whose minimum value is 1,820). Nevertheless, we use the original monthly data to perform the main regressions. 
Results do no change significantly if we use the smoothed data. 
In our sample period, we have four different prices. Most branches (56) didn´t price the plastic bags 
during the 24 months prior to April 2019. The 6% of the observations that have a price equal to UY$ 2 is comprised 
of three branches (April experiment) that charged UY$ 2 between April 2018 and March 2019, plus 11 branches 
that started charging the bags in October 2018, plus 13 branches that charged the bags at UY$ 2 from January 
2019 to March 2019. Three branches charged a price of UY$3 during four months (December 2018 to April 2019). 
In relation to the geographic distribution of the branches, it is important to note that there is at least one branch 
of this supermarket in every one of the 19 departments of the country.  
The supermarket chain has an average market share of 1/3 (considering the area of the stores, the 
number of stores, or the number of registers). In four cities, the supermarket chain is the only large store in town. 
In 20 cities, it owns half or less of the total number of supermarkets. Montevideo, the capital city, is a special 
case, since half of the population of the country lives there, and has 65% of the stores. The bottom panel of Table 
1 presents information at the city level. This information reveals that there are some significant differences 
between the cities in our sample (see subsection 5.3). As some of these cities house our treated branches and 
others our control branches, we control for these differences in some of the regressions that we present below.  
5 Average effects for the full experiment 
5.1 A graphic illustration 
The data on all bags distributed by a supermarket´s branches in a staggered rollout of three different prices 
constitutes a unique opportunity to estimate the effects of these prices on the demand of single-use plastic bags. 
Figure 4 shows a graphic illustration of the effect of the prices on the quantity of plastic bags consumed at the 
average branch in each wave. The green line (marked with triangles) depicts the number of bags delivered at 
zero cost by the average branch in the control group, comprised of fifty-six (56) branches that did not price the 
bags during the period of analysis, April 2017 – March 2019. The rest of the lines depict the number of bags 
delivered or sold by the average branch in each of the different sets of treated branches (a set of branches is the 
group of branches that started pricing the bags in the same date, marked by the vertical lines). Figure 4 illustrates 
a sharp decrease in the number of bags used by customers of branches pricing the bags. The drop in bags used 
occurs in the same month in which the supermarket started pricing them. Moreover, this drop does not seem to 
rebound after three, four, six or 12 months. The last month in the graph (April 2019) shows the additional 
decrease in the demand for plastic bags caused by the price of UY$ 4 in the branches already pricing the bags, 
and in the branches not pricing the bags (green line). More on this below. 





FIGURE 4: AVERAGE NUMBER OF PLASTIC BAGS DELIVERED BY GROUP OF BRANCHES,  
BEFORE AND AFTER PRICING THE BAGS  
Notes: The figure plots the three-month moving average number of plastic bags delivered or sold by group of branches. We 
compute the three-month moving average without overlapping the pre- and post-treatment periods. For ease of viewing, we omitted the 
line corresponding to a branch that began charging UY$ 2 in February 2019. This branch is included in all the econometric analyzes, and 
behaves with the same pattern as other waves. The vertical lines mark the month when each of the groups of stores introduced the price. 
The magnitude of the price increases is shown in Figure 3. The rollout experiment ends in April 2019, when all groups began to charge a 
price of UY$ 4. 
5.2 Parallel trend analysis 
Turning to the formal estimation of the effects of the prices on the demand of single-use plastic bags, we start 
by leaving aside the last month in the sample (when all branches priced the bags UY$ 4), and pooling the different 
waves of the rollout to estimate the average effects of a price of UY$ 2 and UY$ 3. We perform this estimation 
based on a diff-in-diff strategy. The fundamental identification assumption in a diff-in-diff analysis is that of 
parallel pre-treatment trends in the treated and control branches. We perform a parallel trend analysis for each 
of the waves. Figure 5 illustrate the results. There, we plot the coefficients of the interaction between a dummy 
indicator for treatment status and month dummy variables, in a linear OLS regression including a full set of month 
and branch fixed effects and a dummy for treatment. The change in the difference between the average number 
of bags delivered by treatment and control branches in the first month of the sample is not statistically different 
from zero in most of the following months of the pre-treatment period. The exceptions are two months, right 
before the implementation of the prices in wave one, and three months right before the implementation of the 
price in wave three. These could be the consequence of “anticipation effects”. This occurs when treated subjects 
know in advance that they are going to be treated and they react strategically. We discuss the possible existence 
and estimate anticipation effects in section 7.3 as one of our robustness checks.  




Panel (a) First wave: April 2018 (Salto), 3 branches, 
p = $U2, treated 12 months 
 
Panel (b) Second wave: October 2018, 11 branches, 
p = $U2, treated 6 months 
 
Panel (c) Third wave: December 2018, 3 branches, p 
= $U3, treated 4 months 
 
Panel (d) Fourth wave: January 2019, 12 branches, p 
= $U2, treated 3 months 
 
FIGURE 5: CHANGES IN THE INITIAL DIFFERENCE OF BAGS DELIVERED BY MONTH BETWEEN CONTROL 
AND TREATED BRANCHES 
Note: The figure presents a test for parallel trends. We plot the coefficients of the interaction between a dummy variable 
indicating a treated branch and time dummies in a linear OLS regression including a full set of month and branch fixed effects and a 
dummy for treatment. The outcome variable is the total number of plastic bags (in thousands) delivered or sold by branch, smoothed 
with a three-month moving average. Standard errors are clustered at the branch level. We include upper and lower 95% confidence limits. 
 
5.3 The comparability of the different cities 
Although the results of our parallel trends analyses provide sufficient evidence on the plausibility of this critical 
identification assumption, pooling the waves of the rollout could raise the question of the comparability of the 
different cities. These may differ in characteristics that may confound the effect of the price, such as income, 
preferences towards the environment and the market share of the supermarket in the city. Relatedly, the 
supermarket was not the only store in town pricing the bags in the cities of the first and the third waves, but it 
was the only one in the cities of the second and fourth waves. Ceteris paribus, this may be an important 
difference between cities, because it affects the consumers’ cost of substituting the supermarket for alternatives 
stores as a mean to avoid the price. 




To assess the comparability of the cities in the different waves, in Table A.0 we perform difference of 
means tests for selected variables measuring characteristics of the supermarket branches and the cities, in those 
cities in which the chain priced the bags with those in which it did not. We exclude from this analysis the cities 
of Salto and Montevideo. As it can be seen, treated and control cities are similar in most of these characteristics. 
In particular, they are similar in the number of bags delivered by branch, and the size, age composition, 
employment/unemployment rate, education, income and poverty rate of their population. They are also similar 
with respect to the number of supermarkets, convenience stores, schools, gas stations, and other amenities. 
Treated and control cities differ significantly only in the market share of the supermarket and their geographic 
location. With respect the latter, as shown in Table A.0, all the treated branches are in towns or cities located 
west or on Route 5, which runs from Montevideo (south) to Rivera (north), through the center of the country. 
Figure 1 illustrates this graphically. The explanation for this geographic distribution of treated branches is 
logistics, according to a former manager of the supermarket chain that worked in the rollout (personal 
communication, October 9, 2020). The chain´s distribution center is located in the south of the country, right 
north of Montevideo. Pricing the plastic bags in Salto saved the supermarket the transportation of around 
282,000 bags per month to Salto (94,000 bags per branch, according to our results, times 3 branches). This 
liberated approximately 3 m3 of space in trucks. To maximize savings in distribution costs, the supermarket 
decided to rollout the initiative in branches that are in north-west bound routes, the direction of Salto (Figure 1). 
The other statistically significant difference between treated and control cities is the average share of 
the chain in the city grocery market. According to information presented by the supermarket to the national 
Competition Defense Commission, this share is 65% in treated cities and 24% in control cities, as measured by 
area (m2) of stores. These percentages are remarkably similar (64% and 27%) if we use data from Open Street 
Map. Reassuringly, if we use other variables to measure market share, we obtain similar numbers. The chain 
owned 56% of the stores in the cities or towns in which it priced the bags, and 29% in those cities in which it did 
not. Similarly, the chain had 66% of the number of registers in the cities or towns where it priced the bags and 
31% in those where it did not. Relatedly, in the cities where it priced the bags, the average number of 
supermarket branches is 3.9, while it is 6.3 in the control cities. These differences are consistent with the 
hypothesis that, secondary to the logistics criterion, the supermarket managers decided to price the bags in cities 
or towns in which they faced less competition, possibly trying to minimize the chance of losing clients to other 
stores because of the price.14 
Although the DiD identification strategy does not rely on the conditional independence assumption, 
given the above results, we address the concern of the comparability of the different cities with respect the level 
of several variables in three ways. First, in the pooled estimation presented in the next subsection, by introducing 
a set of time-varying covariates measuring socio-demographic characteristics of the cities. Second, by estimating 
 
14 A challenge for the identification strategy would be that managers decided to charge for plastic bags in those branches 
where they expected the consumption to decrease in the absence of treatment. In another related analysis, available in the 
replication files for the paper, we regress the probability that a city is treated on (observable) variables included in Table 
A.0. We find that a dummy variable for being a western city washes out the statistical significance of the other variables, in 
particular market power, the number of bags delivered, or the income of the city's households. We conclude that the main 
determinant of a city being treated is the geographic location (which is absorbed by the fixed effects in all the regressions). 
In other words, conditional on the distribution routes, treatment status can be seen as good as randomly assigned. 




wave-specific treatment effect in the following section. Finally, by creating synthetic controls with the same pre-
treatment level of the main variables. 
5.4 The average effects of prices for the full experiment 
As said, we start by estimating the effect of a price of UY$ 2 and UY$ 3 on the consumption of single-use plastic 
bags using the following equation:  𝐵𝑏𝑐𝑚 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑚 + 𝜇𝑏 + 𝛽𝑝=2𝑃2𝑏𝑚 + 𝛽𝑝=3𝑃3𝑏𝑚 +  𝜸𝒙𝑿𝑐𝑚 + 𝜀𝑏𝑐𝑚    (1) 
In equation (1), 𝐵𝑏𝑐𝑚 represents the number of bags delivered by branch b, located in city c, on month 
m, and 𝛿𝑚 and 𝜇𝑏 are month and branch fixed effects, respectively. 𝑃2𝑏𝑚 is an indicator variable equal to one if 
the price of the bags is UY$ 2 in branch b and month m; 0 otherwise. The coefficient 𝛽𝑝=2 is therefore the 
difference-in-difference estimation of the effect of the UY$ 2 price on the number of bags demanded, with 
respect to the zero-price situation, averaged across branches and months (𝛼). 𝑃3𝑏𝑚 is an identical indicator 
variable equal to one if the price of the bags is UY$ 3 in branch b and month m; 0 otherwise. Consequently,  𝛽𝑝=3 − 𝛽𝑝=2 is the estimation of the additional decrease in the number of bags used when the price of the bags 
increases from UY$ 2 to UY$ 3. The vector 𝑿𝑐𝑚 is a set of time-varying covariates, measuring socio-demographic 
characteristics of the city in which the corresponding branch is located. We obtained these variables from the 
Continuous Household Survey. They are the following: household income (in January 2019 pesos) and the 
proportions of people in the city that are: employed, unemployed, under the poverty line, women, younger than 
14 years old and over 60 years of age. Finally, 𝜀𝑏𝑐𝑚 is the error term, clustered by branch.15 
Column A, in Table 2 shows the diff-in-diff OLS estimates and standard errors of 𝛽𝑝=2 and 𝛽𝑝=3, the 
parameters of interest, when we estimate it without the time-varying controls 𝑿𝑐𝑚. The point estimate of putting 
a price of UY$ 2 is an average decrease of 63,590 bags, per branch, per month. This represents a percentage drop 
of 85.0% from the mean number of bags delivered in the same branches when the price was zero (74,811 bags). 
Column B in Table 2 presents the same estimates when including the time varying controls 𝑿𝑐𝑚. Results remain 
robust and almost identical with the inclusion of these controls. 
  
 
15 We also performed this regression clustering standard errors at the city level. In this case, the standard errors are 
substantially smaller. We take the conservative option in this case, and present the option with the larger standard errors. 




TABLE 2: AVERAGE EFFECT OF PRICES ON THE QUANTITY OF BAGS IN THE FULL EXPERIMENT 
  
(A) (B) 
Price = 2 -63.59*** -63.61*** 
 (5.842) (5.870) 
pct change -85.0% -85.0% 
Price = 3 -41.97*** -42.19*** 
 (7.025) (7.079) 
pct change -84.1% -84.5% 
Controls NO YES 
N 2,075 2,075 
Notes: The table shows the results of an OLS estimation of equation (1). The outcome variable is the number of bags 
delivered/sold by branch, by month. Controls in columns A and B include month and branch fixed effects. Controls in column B also include 
a set of time-varying covariates, measuring socio-demographic characteristics of the city in which the corresponding branch is located. 
We obtained these variables from the Continuous Household Survey. They are the following: household income (in January 2019 pesos) 
and the proportions of people in the city that are: employed, unemployed, under the poverty line, women, younger than 14 years old and 
over 60 years of age. We also include a dummy variable for any of the controls missing. Standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered at the 
branch level. * p<0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
The reduction in plastic bags use estimated for the price of UY$ 3 is almost identical to the one estimated 
for p = UY$ 2, in percentage terms. The estimated effect is a drop of 84.1% without controls and a drop of 84.5% 
when we include controls. Nevertheless, we do not argue that the value of the price does not matter. First, we 
only have 12 observations for p = UY$3. Second, the effects are not that similar when we estimate wave-specific 
treatment effects, in section 6. Finally, it is easy to see in Figure 6 that the price of UY$ 4 produced an additional 
drop in the demand for plastic bags in all branches, independently of the previous level of the price.  





FIGURE 6: PRE AND POST PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN BAGS USED 
Notes: The figure shows a pre-post analysis of the effect of five different price increases on the quantity of plastic bags used. X-
axis: event time 0 is the month when price increase took place. Y-axis: Pre-treatment consumption normalized to one. The line that plots 
consumption for those stores that increased prices from 0 to 2 includes 27 branches from four waves (April, October, December 2018, 
and February 2019). See Figure 3. The second line plots the consumption of bags in the three branches that started pricing the bags UY$3 
in December 2018. The line “from 0 to $4” consists of 56 branches that did not price until April 2019. The fourth line, “from $2 to $4” 
consists of the 27 branches that were charging UY$ 2 (and thus are included in the first line), when they started charging $4 in April 2019. 
The last line are the three branches that increased the price from UY$3 to UY$4. We do not have data for the months following the $4 
price increase. 
To estimate the additional effect of a price of UY$ 4 depicted in Figure 6 more formally, we perform a 
pre-post analysis. To do it, we define five events, according to the number of different price increases in Figure 
6. Second, we trimmed the database, dropping all the observations corresponding to the months that were more 
than two months ahead and more than two months after a month in which a price increase took place. Third, 
we restructure the database as in an event study; normalizing to zero the months in which the price increases 
took place. Fourth, we defined five groups of branches, according to the number of events (i.e., Group1 is 
comprised by the branches that increased prices from UY$ 0 to UY$ 2, Group2 is comprised by the branches that 
increased prices from UY$ 0 to UY$ 3, and so forth). Finally, for each branch, we normalize to one the average 
number of bags consumed in the two months before the change in price. With the resulting database, we 
estimate the following equation: 𝐵𝑏𝑔𝑚 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝜇𝑔𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑔𝑔=5𝑔=2 + ∑  𝜇𝑔𝑔=5𝑔=1 (𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑔 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚) + 𝜀𝑏𝑔𝑚    (2) 
The variable 𝐵𝑏𝑔𝑚 in equation 2 represents the number of bags delivered by branch b, of group g, in 
month m. Groupg is an indicator variable that takes de value of 1 if branch b belongs to group g, and zero 
otherwise. The constant (𝛼) represents the pre-treatment bags consumption for branches that belong to Group1 
and is equal to one by construction (pre-treatment consumption was normalized to one). Afterm is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one for observations in event-time = 0, 1 or 2. The coefficients 𝛿𝑔 are our 




coefficients of interest, representing the pre-post impact of different price increases on the number of bags 
demanded.  
TABLE 3: RESULTS OF THE PRE-POST ESTIMATION OF THE EFFECTS OF FIVE DIFFERENT PRICE INCREASES ON 
THE QUANTITY OF BAGS 
  
   p value: equality of coefficients 












Price change:        
from $0 to $2 -0.709***  . 0.3060 0.0000 0.0000 0.0091 
 (0.011)       
from $0 to $3 -0.737***  0.3060 . 0.0011  0.0000  0. 0151 
 (0.025)       
from $0 to $4 -0.826***  0.0000 0.0011 .  0.0000  0.0001 
 (0.007)       
from $2 to $4 -0.446***  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 . 0.5495 
 (0.034)       
from $3 to $4 -0.497***  0.0091  0. 0151  0.0001 0.5495 . 
 (0.079)       
N 407            
Notes: The left panel of the table shows the results of an OLS estimation of equation (2). The outcome variable is the number 
of bags delivered/sold by branch, by month. Consumption for event time -2 and -1 is normalized to one. The construction of the pre-post 
database is explained in the main text. The right panel presents the results of 10 Wald test for the equality of the coefficients from the 
regression in column (A). Standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered at the branch level. * p<0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Recognizing that a pre-post analysis is a method that requires more identification assumptions, Table 3 
illustrates that both price increases from UY$ 2 to UY$ 4 and from UY$ 3 to UY$ 4 are associated with significant 
additional drops in the use of plastic bags. More specifically, the average number of bags used by clients in a 
month decreased an additional 44.6% in those branches that were pricing the bags UY$ 2 after they increased 
the price to UY$ 4. Moreover, it decreased an additional 49.7% in those branches that were pricing the bags 
UY$3. For reference, using this identification strategy, a change in price from zero to UY$ 2 decreases the demand 
for plastic bags by around 70%. This effect is similar to the effect of a change from zero to UY$ 3: a decrease of 
74%. In the right panel of Table 3 we show that the decrease in consumption with a price of UY$ 2 is not 
statistically different from a price of UY$ 3 (p-value = 0.215), but it is statistically different from the decrease in 
consumption with a price of UY$ 4.  
6 Wave-specific treatment effects 
In section 5, we partially addressed the issue of the in-levels comparability of the cities and waves of the rollout 
by including city-level fixed-effects and time-varying covariates in the estimation of equation 1. In this section, 
we deepen our analysis of this issue and we conduct wave-specific estimations to explore possible differences in 
the effect of the price among waves.  




We present two sets of wave-specific estimations. In the first set, we use, for every wave (a) the same 
period of analysis (April 2017 – March 2019) and (b) the same control group (comprised of the 56 branches that 
did not price the bags during the whole period). In the second set, we use a wave-specific synthetic control (the 
donor pool is always the pool of 56 branches that did not price the bags in the period).  
Figure A.2 graphically illustrates the effect of the price for the four waves. The overall picture is that 
pricing for single-use plastic bags had a large, immediate and persistent negative effect on the quantity of bags 
used by customers, regardless of the location of the branch and the date of implementation.  
To determine the magnitude and significance of the effects in a formal manner, we estimate the 
following equation, for each wave: 𝐵𝑏𝑚 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑚 + 𝜇𝑏 + 𝛽(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡)𝑏𝑚 + 𝛾𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑏 + 𝛿𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑚 + 𝜀𝑏𝑚                   (3) 
As in the case of equation 1, here 𝐵𝑏𝑚 represents the number of bags delivered by branch b on month 
m, and 𝛿𝑚 and 𝜇𝑏 are month and branch fixed effects, respectively. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑏 and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑚 are indicator variables 
for the branches pricing the bags and the months after the price, respectively, and 𝜀𝑏𝑚 is the error term, 
clustered by branch. Again, 𝛽 is our coefficient of interest, capturing the difference-in-difference effect of the 
price for the average treated branch in the wave in question, compared to the average control branch in the set 
of the 56 branches that did not price the bags. We also estimated variations of the above equation, including 
combinations of branch fixed-effects, month fixed-effects, and branch-specific time trends. 
Table 4 shows the results of the OLS estimation of equation (3), for each wave.16 The 12-month effect of 
the price in Salto (column (A)) is -74.9%. Column B shows that the UY$ 2 price decreased the demand for bags 
85%, on average, in the branches and cities that constituted the second wave, during the first six months. Finally, 
the same price produced a decrease of 70.5% in the use of bags in the first three months in the branches and 
cities of the fourth wave, on average. In sum, compared to the average branch in the set of 56 that did not price 
the bags during the period, a price of UY$ 2 produced a drop between 70.5% and 84.7%. A price of UY$3 (third 
wave) produced a drop of 81%. Summed over branches and months, the UY$ 2 price discouraged the use of an 
estimated 9.085 million bags and a price of UY$ 3 discouraged the use of 485,400 bags. 
  
 
16 The full set of results for each wave are included in the Appendix. 




TABLE 4: WAVE SPECIFIC REGRESSIONS RESULTS 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) 








Price UY$ 2 UY$ 2 UY$ 3 UY$ 2 
Average treatment effect of the 
Price 
-93.52*** -57.20*** -40.45*** -53.98*** 
 (7.44) (7.06) (7.08) (8.54) 
Pre-treament mean of treated 124.9 67.57 49.93 76.52 
Percentage change  -74.9% -84.7% -81.0% -70.5% 
N 1,429 1,621 1,428 1,644 
Notes: The table shows the difference-in-difference estimates from equation (3). Outcome variable: number of bags 
delivered/sold by branch, by month. Control group: 56 branches that did not price the plastic bags during the sample period. Mean before 
treatment is the average number of bags delivered by treated branches (in each experiment) when price was zero (pre-treatment). 
Controls include month and branch fixed effects. Standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered at the branch level. * p<0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** 
p < 0.01  
 
The DiD estimate from our full experiment (Table 2) is a weighted average of all the possible two-
group/two-period DiD estimators (Goodman-Bacon, 2019). Using his decomposition, we can study how each of 
these estimators contribute to the main estimates. We find that 87% of the variation in the data that is 
responsible for our main estimates comes from the comparison of the treated units against the pure control 
group of the 56 branches that did not price the bags.17 This result means that our wave specific estimates from 
Table 4 are the main force behind the full-experiment results in Table 2. Moreover, our wave-specific individual 
DiD results can be easily linked one-to-one with the “Bacon decomposition” of the full experiment. (See Figure 
A.3 in the appendix section 10.9). Doing this, we find that the DiD main estimation places the largest weight on 
the October wave of the experiment, followed by the January and April experiments. All 2x2 comparisons yield 
a negative treatment effect. 
7 Robustness checks 
7.1 Event study design 
Goodman-Bacon (2019) points out that, in studies in which there is variation in when the treatment status turns 
on like ours, the coefficients of a DiD specification may be biased if the treatment effect varies monotonically 
 
17 The other sources of variation for our DiD are the comparison of (1) earlier treated branches with later treated ones acting 
as controls (weighing 10%), and (2) later treated branches with earlier treated ones acting as controls (weighing 3%). For 
this exercise, we define treatment as pricing the bags, either 2 or 3 UY$. The combined effect of the two prices is a drop of 
62 thousand bags (a weighted average between the drops of 64 and 42 thousand bags from Table 2, corresponding to a 
price of UY$2 and UY$3, respectively). To have a balanced panel, we excluded the four branches that went out of business 
before the first wave of the experiment (see footnote 13). 




over time (gets bigger with time since treatment). In this case, he suggests to present results from an event study 
design with a more transparent control group. Although our data does not support the fact that the treatment 
effect increases with time since treatment, we conduct the estimation of the effect of the UY$ 2 and UY$ 3 prices 
based on an event-study design. We present the results of this analysis in this section. To restructure the DiD 
setting into an event study, we treat each of the four waves of the pricing experiment as a separate dataset. In 
each dataset, we set the month when branches started charging the bags as the event-month zero. Following 
Goodman-Bacon, we then drop the observations of the already treated branches (branches that had entered the 
rollout in previous waves) from the control observations and we focus on the three months before and after 
treatment. We then append the four datasets, in what sometimes is labeled as a stacked DiD.  
To estimate the effect of charging the bags with the event study specification, we estimate the following 
equation  𝐵𝑏𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜇𝑏 +  𝜌 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑏𝑡 +  ∑  𝛽𝑡𝑡=  3𝑡=−2 (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑏𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡) +  𝜸𝒙𝑿𝑏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑏𝑡  (4) 
In equation 4, the variable 𝐵𝑏𝑡 represents the number of bags delivered by branch b in event time t, and 𝛿𝑡  and 𝜇𝑏 are time (t=-2,…,3) and branch fixed effects, respectively. The variable 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑏𝑡 is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one for branches charging a price of UY$ 2 or UY$ 3 on event time t. Our main 
coefficients of interest are 𝛽𝑡 which capture the monthly difference between treatment and control branches, 
relative to event time -3. The pre-treatment betas serve as a test for the parallel trend assumption. Estimates of 
the pre-treatment's betas not statistically different from zero are consistent with this assumption. The vector 𝑿𝑏𝑡 consists of the same set of time-varying covariates, measuring socio-demographics, defined in equation (1). 
Finally, 𝜀𝑏𝑡 is the error term, clustered by branch. 
We present the results of the OLS estimation of the 𝛽𝑡 in equation 4 in Table 5 below. What these results 
show is, first, that the data supports the assumption of parallel trends. Moreover, the treated and control 
branches were delivering the same number of bags in the two months before treatment. Second, the average 
effect of the price was a monthly decrease of around 56 thousand bags per month, per branch, in the first three 
months of the price. This corresponds to an average drop of 74%, relative to the pre-treatment mean. This result 
does not change if we include a set of time-varying covariates, measuring socio-demographic characteristics of 
the city in which the corresponding branch is located (column B), or not (column A). These results are similar to 
the results that we obtain with our main analysis and therefore provide evidence in favor of their robustness. 
  




TABLE 5: EVENT STUDY IMPACT OF A UY$ 2 OR UY$ 3 PRICE ON BAG CONSUMPTION 
  
(A) (B) 
Treated * (time=-2)  -3.76 -4.77 
 (6.71) (7.31) 
Treated * (time=-1)  -1.14 -4.13 
 (6.89) (7.31) 
Treated * (time=0)  -65.38*** -65.42*** 
 (8.53) (9.49) 
Treated * (time=1)  -62.35*** -65.00*** 
 (8.08) (8.70) 
Treated * (time=2)  -67.55*** -67.90*** 
 (8.22) (9.21) 
Controls No Yes 
N 1,755 1,755 
Notes: The table shows the results of an OLS estimation of equation (4). The outcome variable is the number of bags 
delivered/sold by branch, by event time. Controls in columns A and B include month and time fixed effects and a dummy for treatment 
status. Controls in column B also include a set of time-varying covariates, measuring socio-demographic characteristics of the city in which 
the corresponding branch is located (see notes to Table 2). Standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered at the branch level. * p<0.10, ** p 
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Figure 7 shows the results in both levels and trends.18 First of all, we notice the parallel evolution of bag 
consumption in treated and control branches during the three months prior to the start of treatment (a price of 
UY$ 2 or UY$ 3). Second, the drop in consumption is instant and persistent during the following three months. 
Panel (B) in Figure 7 plots the estimated 𝛽𝑡 from equation (4). 
  
 
18 Although DiD doesn’t require that treated and control branches deliver a similar number of bags per month, identification 
assumptions will be generally more plausible if treated and control branches are similar in levels and not just in trends. This 
is the reason why we present results in levels and in differences. Nonetheless, in our setting, except for the April wave 
(Salto), the rest have similar pre-treatment levels (Figure 4).  




Panel (a) Bag consumption for T and C 
 
Panel (b) Difference in bag consumption 
 
FIGURE 7: EVENT STUDY DESIGN FOR THE IMPACT OF A UY$ 2 OR UY$ 3 PRICE ON BAG CONSUMPTION 
Notes: The figure shows the impact of charging for plastic bags on consumption, for treated and control branches. Panel (a) 
shows the series in levels, while panel (b) shows the difference between treated and control branches, with the respective 95% confidence 
interval, corresponding to the model from Table 5, column (B). Treated branches charged for the plastic bags at event time zero. Control 
branches consist of branches that did not charge for bags during those six months. We exclude branches that were already charging for 
the bags in pre-treatment event time. The four main experiments from Figure A.2 are included.  
7.2 Wave-specific synthetic controls 
As another robustness check of the results obtained in section 5, in this section we use synthetic controls as 
another identification strategy for the estimation of the wave-specific effects. The motivation for performing a 
synthetic-control analysis is provided by the fact that, although we test for the parallel trend assumption in the 
previous diff-in-diff analyses, the ability of the control group to reproduce the counterfactual outcome trajectory 
that an average branch in each of the waves would have experienced in the absence of the intervention may still 
be questioned. There are at least two reasons why. One is the different sizes of the branches in the treatment 
group and those in the control group. Another reason is, as in any diff-in-diff analysis, the possible presence of 
unobservable, time-varying differences between treated and control branches that may correlate with the 
treatment. For all these reasons, we repeat the analysis using a synthetic control method (Abadie and 
Gardeazabal, 2003). The idea behind this method is that a combination of untreated branches may provide a 
better comparison for the branches exposed to the price. The synthetic control method introduces control for 
the time-varying heterogeneity because the combination of branches comprising the synthetic control is the 
result of an optimization across branches and time (Bueno and Valente, 2019).  
The donor pool in every case is comprised of the 56 branches that serve as control in the diff-in-diff 
estimations. We match using pre-intervention values of the outcome variable (number of bags delivered by 
branch by month). To fit each of the wave-specific synthetic controls, we use all the observations of the pre-
treatment period for that wave of the experiment, except for a validation period comprised of the last three 
months before the intervention. Figure 8 shows the monthly levels of bags delivered or sold by the average 
treated branch in each wave of the experiment and its synthetic control.19  
 
19 In Figure A.4 we show that results are robust to leave-one-out estimations of the synthetic control (Abadie, forthcoming). 




Panel (a) First wave: April 2018 (Salto), 3 
branches, p = $U 2, treated 12 months 
 
Panel (b) Second wave: October 2018, 11 
branches, p = $U 2, treated 6 months 
 
Panel (c) Third wave: December 2018, 3 
branches, p = $U 3, treated 4 months 
 
Panel (d) Fourth wave: January 2019, 12 
branches, p = $U 2, treated 3 months 
 
FIGURE 8: AVERAGE NUMBER OF BAGS DELIVERED BY TREATED BRANCHES IN EACH WAVE (RED CONTINUOUS 
LINE) AND ITS SYNTHETIC CONTROL (GREEN DOTTED LINE), BY MONTH 
Notes: These figures show the three-month moving average number of bags delivered or sold by treated branches and a 
corresponding synthetic control, for each wave, expressed in thousands of monthly bags per store. In every case, the donor pool for the 
synthetic control is comprised of the 56 branches that did not price the bags during the period. The fit between treated units and the 
synthetic control is achieved by minimizing a quadratic loss function base on the values of the outcome before the treatment period. The 
pre-treatment timespan is divided into a training period and a validation period consisting of the last three months before treatment.  
 
Table 6 shows the diff-in-diff estimation of the effect of the price, for each wave, against a wave-specific 
synthetic control. In general, these results are similar to the DiD estimates obtained when using the 56 branches 
that did not priced the bags as control (that is, the estimation of equation (3), whose results we show in Table 
4). The only exception may be the fourth wave. In this case, the (three-month) effect of the price estimated with 
a synthetic control is -79%, while it was -70.5% when estimated by equation 2.  
  




TABLE 6: WAVE-SPECIFIC TREATMENT EFFECTS, SYNTHETIC CONTROLS 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) 
  
Salto  
April 2018  
Second wave 
October 2018  
Third wave  
December 2018  
Fourth wave 
January 2019  
Price UY$ 2 UY$ 2 UY$ 3 UY$ 2 
Average pre-treatment difference 2.99 0.19 2.83 0.89 
Average post-treatment difference -92.31 -54.30 -39.22 -59.27 
Difference in difference -95.30 -54.49 -42.05 -60.17 
Percentage change -77.4% -80.4% -85.2% -79.0% 
N 48 48 48 48 
Notes: Outcome variable: thousand bags delivered/sold by branch, by month. Control group: wave-specific synthetic control from 
donor pool of 56 branches that did not price plastic bags during the sample period. Percentage change is the difference-in-difference drop 
as percentage of the average number of bags delivered by treated branches (in each experiment) when price was zero (pre-treatment). 
As a last step in the estimation of the effect using wave-specific synthetic controls, in what follows, we 
perform placebo tests to assess the statistical significance of the reduction in bag consumption in the synthetic 
control estimation. In these tests, we assign the treatment status to each unit in the control group and we 
estimate “placebo effects” by applying the synthetic control method. As suggested by Abadie (2019), we exclude 
the treated units from the donor pool in the placebo iterations and we exclude counterfactuals with a poor pre-
treatment fit, defined as the five placebo units with worst pre-treatment MSPE. Figure 9 compares the actually 
treated average branch in each wave with the placebo distribution that results from the permutation exercise. 
It shows the difference in the number of bags delivered between each of the 56 placebo branches and its 
synthetic (grey lines) and the treated branch and its synthetic (black lines). Panels on the left show the difference 
by month and panels on the right show the accumulated difference. It is easy to observe that, in each experiment, 
the effect of the pricing on the branches affected by the treatment is an extreme value relative to the 
permutation distribution. We can therefore conclude that the decrease in the consumption of plastic bags does 
not seem to be random. The estimated Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT) is larger than the 
estimated ATT for the placebo branches.  
The accumulated differences (right panel) of the effect of the treated branches are also an extreme value 
with respect to the placebo distributions. A possible exception may be the third wave (December 2018 
experiment), in which the accumulated difference is not the lowest value of the series. The reason may be that 
the three treated branches increased the delivery of bags in a notorious way in the months before the beginning 
of the policy (we will address this issue in the next section). Another possible reason is that we only observe 
three months of the post-treatment period for this wave. In other words, it is possible that the accumulated 
difference between the units treated in December and their synthetic control would become the largest if we 
could have observed more months in the series, as it does in waves with longer post-treatment periods.  
  



































































FIGURE 9: PLACEBO TESTS: DIFFERENCE IN NUMBER OF BAGS DELIVERED BY TREATED (BLACK LINES) 
AND PLACEBO (GREY LINES) BRANCHES WITH CORRESPONDING SYNTHETIC CONTROL 
Notes: These figures show placebo tests for the synthetic control estimations by wave. On the left panel we show (in black lines) 
the monthly difference in the number of bags delivered between the treated branches and their synthetic control. It corresponds to the 
difference between the solid and the dotted line in Figure 8. The grey lines are the placebo treatment effects for each one of the 56 
control branches, as explained in the main text. Panels on the right show the accumulated monthly difference, for the treated unit and 
each of the placebo treatments. 
 
To conclude this subsection, overall, what the wave-specific results show is that putting a price of UY$ 2 
or UY$ 3 decreased the demand for single-use plastic bags considerably. The size of the drop lies between 70% 




and 85%, depending on the cities and identification strategy. When using a DiD identification strategy, the results 
do not show a clear difference between the impacts of the two prices on demand. When using synthetic controls, 
the estimation of the effect of the UY$ 3 price is around 5 percentage points larger. In addition, the overall results 
of the wave-specific estimations show that the size of the average effect of the price of UY$ 2 is robust to all the 
possible differences introduced with the rollout. In particular, the estimate of the average effect is robust to city 
and branch sizes, time spell of the intervention and whether the supermarket is the only one pricing the bags in 
town or not. Based on the result of the placebo tests, we can conclude that it is difficult to argue that this effect 
was random, and not caused by the price. Figure 9 also shows that the effect of the price persists over time. 
7.3 Anticipation effects 
With the only exception of the second wave (October 2018), Figures 8 and 9 show that treated branches exhibit 
a rise in the consumption of bags during the last months before the intervention, relative to their control. This 
rise may be the result of an “anticipation effect”. This occurs when treated subjects know in advance that they 
are going to be treated and they react strategically. We cannot rule out this possibility in our case study. In other 
words, clients may have known in advance that bags would be priced in some of the cases studied. In Salto, for 
example, as explained in the introduction, clients were actually informed of the future price during the campaign 
led by the city chamber of commerce. Moreover, adhered stores displayed the campaign sign at their entrance, 
communicating their shoppers that bags a price for plastic bags would come into effect in April 2, 2018. As a 
result, it is fair to conclude that clients knew about the price before its actual implementation. In fact, this was 
the conclusion of a local newspaper that surveyed stores and customers during the first day of the 
implementation of the price (Diario El Pueblo, 2018).  
Knowing in advance that the plastic bags would be priced, customers may have increased the use of bags 
before the price went into effect to stock costless bags. Because this would bias our estimation on the effects of 
the prices, we need to take it into account. This is what we do in this section. 
To include the anticipation effect in the estimation, we backdate the intervention period and divide it in 
two: an announcement period and an implementation period. The announcement period is the period in which 
subjects are informed about the future implementation of the price, but this have not yet taken place. The 
implementation period starts with the actual implementation of the price. We set the length of the 
announcement period to 4 months. The reason for choosing 4 months (for all waves) is that the municipal 
government and the chamber of commerce of Salto (first wave) held a press conference to launch the campaign 
four months before the price (in December 4, 2017). No press conference took place in the rest of the waves. It 
is fair to conclude then that more customers may have found out about the future price at an earlier date in Salto 
than in the rest of the waves. Nevertheless, we use the same length for the rest of the waves for consistency.  
By dividing the intervention period in an announcement period and an implementation period, we are 
able to estimate separately the effect of the anticipation of the price and the effect of the price itself. To do this, 
we estimate the following equation, for each wave of the experiment: 𝐵𝑏𝑚 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑚 + 𝜇𝑏 + 𝛽1(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 × 𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑)𝑏𝑚 + 𝛽2(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 × 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑)𝑏𝑚 +𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑏 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑚 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑚 + 𝜀𝑏𝑚              (5) 




As in the case of previous equations, here 𝐵𝑏𝑚 represents the number of bags delivered by branch b on 
month m, and 𝛿𝑚 and 𝜇𝑏 are month and branch fixed effects, respectively. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑏 is an indicator variable for 
the branches pricing the bags. 𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑚 is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 in the 
four months previous to the implementation of the price. During these months, the bags where still free, but 
clients could have known that the supermarket would price them at the implementation date. 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑚 
is another indicator variable for the months in which the price was in effect. Finally, 𝜀𝑏𝑚 is the error term, 
clustered by branch. Our coefficients of interest are 𝛽1 and 𝛽2. The former captures the difference-in-difference 
effect of the announcement. The latter, the effect of the price. In both cases, the estimation compares the 
average treated branch in the wave in question with the average branch in the set of the 56 branches that did 
not price the bags during the whole period of analysis.20 
Results of the estimation of equation (5) are in Table 7. Each column (A) to (D) represents the results of 
a specific wave. As shown in line 3 of Table 7, we find evidence consistent with an anticipation effect for the 
cases of the first and third waves. In the case of the first wave (column A), clients of the supermarket increased 
the demand for bags by an average 10.6% during the 4 months previous to the implementation of the price, 
relative to the average pretreatment mean number of bags delivered by the treated branches. This number is 
37.7% in the case of the third wave (column C). On the other hand, we do not find a statistically significant diff-
in-diff number of bags in the second and fourth waves.  
These results are consistent with the fact that clients were aware of the future price for plastic bags in 
Salto (first wave) and in Las Piedras and La Paz (second wave). We know that customers in Salto were informed 
in advance, but the question remains about how could the customers in the other two cities became aware? The 
easier answers to this question are that the supermarket informed their clients about the implementation of the 
price, or that this information leaked. Even though we do not have information to confirm any of the answers, 
we rely on the fact that in these two cities the price was the result of an agreement with more supermarkets to 
conclude that these answers are plausible. To support this conclusion further, we recall that in the rest of the 
towns where we do not find evidence of an anticipation effect, the supermarket was the only store pricing the 
bags. In sum, our findings are consistent with an anticipation effect in those cities where we can confirm that the 
stores pricing the bags informed their clients about the price in advance (Salto) and those cities in which this is 
plausible. The anticipation effect is positive: informed customers in Salto and plausibly aware customers in La 
Paz and Las Piedras demanded more costless bags before the implementation of the price, possibly for future 
use. On the other hand, clients do not seem to have anticipated the price in the towns in which the supermarket 
was the only one pricing the bags.  
  
 
20 We also estimated, for each wave, variations to equation (3), including combinations of branch fixed-effects, month fixed-
effects and branch-specific time trends. The results are in the appendix. 




TABLE 7: ANTICIPATION EFFECTS 
 













119.7 66.57  74.58 72.22 
  45.02  45.02 
DiD anticipation 
12.74*** -2.55 16.97*** -0.47 3.89 
(3.47) (1.98) (3.45) (4.03) (2.44) 
pct change 10.6% -3.8% 37.7% -0.6% 5.6% 
DiD Price = 2 
-89.27*** -57.77***  -54.07*** -62.31*** 
(7.00) (7.04)  (8.59) (5.64) 
pct change -74.6% -86.8%  -72.5% -86.0% 
DiD Price = 3 
 
  -37.00***  -40.92*** 
  (7.50)  (7.09) 
pct change   -82.2%  -90.9% 
N 1,429 1,621 1,428 1,644 2,075 
Notes: The table shows the difference-in-difference estimates corresponding to equation 5. Each column is a different 
regression. Outcome variable: number of bags delivered/sold by branch, by month. Control group: 56 branches that did not charge price 
plastic bags during the sample period. Controls include month and branch fixed effects. Standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered at the 
branch level. * p<0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Comparing the results in Table 4 and those in Table 7 above, we can see how not considering the 
anticipation effect causes to overestimate the true impact of the price. Effectively, in Table 4 we show that the 
effect of the price in Salto was a drop of 93.520 bags per month, per branch. When we disentangle the 
anticipation effect from the longer-term effect (Table 7), we find that the policy caused a drop of 89.270 bags. In 
other words, the “naïve” estimation over-estimate the effect of the price by 4.25 thousand bags per month per 
branch.21 The bias introduced by the anticipation effect in the case of the third wave (December) is of 3.45 
thousand bags per month, per branch (remember that these branches are significantly smaller than those in 
Salto).  
The existence of anticipation effects illustrates the advantage of having a long pre-treatment monthly 
period, to being able to disentangle them. To see this, we ask ourselves what our policy evaluation would have 
been if we only had had only three months of pre-treatment data. As shown in Table 8, the difference-in-
difference OLS coefficient of the effect of the price in Salto when using only three months before and three 
months after the price (column A) is 28% higher than that presented in Table 4 (showed again in Table 8, line 1). 
In the case of the third wave, column C, the coefficient is 41% higher. In other words, impact evaluations with 
short pre-treatment periods may look quite different from longer-term evaluations, particularly when subjects 
anticipate the policy.  
  
 
21 When we express the coefficient in terms of percentage change of the pre-treatment mean, the two magnitudes are 
almost identical: -74.9 vs -74.6. The reason is that the pre-treatment mean is not the same in Table 4 and 7. In the first case, 
that mean is higher because it includes the anticipation period. Therefore, both the estimated coefficient and the pre-
treatment mean are higher. 




TABLE 8: THREE-MONTH VS LONGER RUN EFFECTS 










A. 24-month estimation -93.52*** -57.20*** -40.45*** -53.98*** 
 (7.44) (7.06) (7.08) (8.54) 
N 1.429 1.621 1.428 1.644 
B. 6-month estimation -119.27*** -61.27*** -57.20*** -52.89*** 
 (11.08) (8.88) (5.72) (9.71) 
N 353 401 353 408 
Difference in coefficients 28% 7% 41% -2% 
Notes: The table shows the wave-specific difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of the prices. The 24-month estimation 
shows the effect of the prices when using data for the entire period. The 6-month estimation shows the results when using data for a 
censored period that includes only the last three months of the pre-treatment period and the first three months of the post–treatment 
period. Outcome variable: number of bags delivered/sold by branch, by month. Control group: 56 branches that did not priced the plastic 
bags during the sample period. Controls include month and branch fixed effects. Standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered at the branch 
level. * p<0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
7.4 Effect on sales 
A possible concern regarding our results is that the drop in the use of bags that we observe may not only be the 
effect of prices, but also the consequence of a loss of sales. Because the supermarket chain was the only store 
pricing plastic bags in most of the cities where it did, to avoid paying for a bag, clients could have well opted to 
go to other stores, in the same cities, that were not charging the bags. Moreover, even in Salto (wave 1), La Paz 
and Las Piedras (wave 3), where the supermarket was not the only one pricing the bags, there were stores giving 
out plastic bags for free, so clients could have opted to go to these other stores in these cities also. To assess 
whether this actually happened, and to what extent, the ideal test would be to conduct a diff-in-diff analysis 
between the monthly values of sales of all branches that priced the bags (treated) and those branches that did 
not (control). However, we do not have this data. Nonetheless, we could gather data of monthly sales for the 
three branches in the city of Salto (treated) and two of the 56 control branches. This data spans from April 2017 
to March 2019. The two control branches are located in the close cities of San Carlos and Maldonado. Maldonado 
is the twin city of Punta del Este, an international summer resort located on the southeastern Atlantic coast of 
Uruguay. The branch located in Maldonado, therefore, experiences more seasonal variation than the rest of the 
branches in this comparison. Taking this consideration, with this data, we perform a diff-in-diff OLS estimation 
identical to those above (using branch and month fixed effects, and errors clustered at the branch level) to 
estimate a possible effect of pricing the bags on inflation-adjusted sales.  
  




TABLE 9 – DiD EFFECT OF CHARGING FOR BAGS ON SALES 
  
(A) (B) (C) 
  Sales Bags Bags/Sales 
Treated (Salto) -4.41 -104.74*** -0.104*** 
(2.86) (9.03) (0.005) 
mean before 102.08 124.85 0.126 
pct change -4.32 -83.89 -82.71 
N 120 120 120 
Notes: This table shows the DiD estimate of the effect of pricing the plastic bags on total sales at the branch level. We perform 
the analysis with three treated stores from Salto and two control stores (one in Maldonado and one in San Carlos). The total number of 
observations corresponds to five branches times 24 months. Column A: sales when netting out the revenue generated by charging the 
bags in Salto after April 2018. They are expressed in Uruguayan pesos of January 2019 and for confidentiality reasons were transformed 
them to an index with base average monthly level of sales for the entire sample equal 100. Column B: bags are measured in thousands. 
Column C: The number of bags is divided by the sales in dollars. Controls include month and branch fixed effects. Standard errors (in 
parenthesis) clustered at the branch level. * p<0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Results (Table 9) show that sales in Salto decreased 4.3% in real terms relative to the control branches, on 
average, although the result is not statistically significant at the 10% level (p value = 0.197; 95% CI: -12.34, 3.52). 
At the same time, consistent with the main results above (Table 2), when estimating the effect of the price on 
the number of bags with data for these five stores (three in Salto (treated), one Maldonado and one in San Carlos 
(controls)), the OLS estimate is a drop of 83.9% (p value = 0.000, 95% CI: -129.8, -79.7 monthly thousand bags). 
Reassuringly, the effect of the price on the number of bags per 2019 dollar of sales is a drop of 82.7% (p value = 
0.000, 95% CI: -0.112, -0.096 bags per dollar of sales). Another way of expressing this result is that the average 
customer real expenditure per disposable plastic bag increased, from $9.2 to $27.1 in 2019 dollars. Thus, even 
considering a possible loss of sales, the policy had a large impact.  
Although we need more data to formally rule out the possibility that pricing the bags caused a loss in sales, 
a careful look at the context and some of the results above suggest otherwise. If clients had moved to others 
stores as a response to the price of plastic bags, we would observe lower estimates of the effect of the price in 
cities where the supermarket was the only store pricing the bags than in those in which it was not (Salto, La Paz, 
Las Piedras). Nevertheless, we can see in Table 4 that the effect of p = 2 when the supermarket is the only one 
pricing the bags is -85% (October 2018 wave) and -71% (January 2019 wave), while it is -75% (Salto) and -81% 
(December 2018 wave) when it is not. Not finding consistent evidence that pricing plastic bags caused the 
supermarket to lose sales makes sense. Take the first wave. A loss of clients in this case is improbable because, 
as commented in Section 3, the estimated grocery market-share of the supermarket in Salto is between 40% and 
50%. Moreover, all supermarkets in Salto, and a considerable proportion of grocery stores, street markets, 
bakeries and butcher shops in the city adopted the price. Very possibly, this made the substitution of the 
supermarket for others stores very costly for its clients, who would have needed to walk to separate stores to 
shop for different products. In addition, these smaller stores surely had higher prices. Therefore, the cost of 
substituting the bags for the clients of the supermarket was not only that of the opportunity cost of walking-
time, but also that of the higher expenditure in groceries and other products. The substitution of the supermarket 
for other stores may even had been physically impossible in the short run, as those relatively small and few stores 




needed to serve a relatively large number of customers. Although to a lesser extent, similar arguments are valid 
for the towns of the third wave (La Paz and Las Piedras), where all supermarkets priced the bags, and even in the 
cases in which the supermarket was the only store in town pricing the bags. Finally, if the supermarket had lost 
clients because of pricing the bags, it would have not rolled out the price to other branches in other cities, as it 
did. Quite the contrary, the voluntary rollout suggests that pricing the bags may have been profitable. 
8 Conclusion and discussion 
We find that prices of US$ 0.07 and US$ 0.10 per bag caused a very large drop in the number of plastic bags used 
by customers of a discount supermarket chain in Uruguay. The estimated drop lies between 70% and 85%, with 
no clear difference between the two prices. Estimates are robust in magnitude and statistical significance to 
different methods of estimation and different specifications of the estimated equation. Placebo tests lead us to 
conclude that the effect that we find is not the result of chance. Despite limited data, we fail to find evidence 
that the supermarket´s sales decreased as a consequence of pricing the bags. Quite the contrary, the fact that 
the chain rolled out the price to other cities voluntarily is consistent with the hypothesis that pricing the plastic 
bags increased its profits. Finally, although we were unable to identify a clear difference in the effects of the two 
prices, a price of US$ 0.14 seems to have had a significant additional effect in the demand for plastic bags in all 
branches, independently of the previous level of the price. We estimate that this price may have decreased the 
overall demand by an additional 40%, on average. 
In some waves of the rollout of the pricing initiative, we find evidence of an increase in the demand for 
zero-price bags during the period of three months right before the implementation of the price. This evidence is 
consistent with a strategic behavior from clients who were informed about the upcoming price, or may have 
anticipated it. This strategic behavior biases upward the estimated effect of the price in the short run.  
The large impacts on bag use that we report are similar in cities in which the supermarket was the only 
one pricing the bags and in cities in which it was not. Notwithstanding, we do find evidence consistent with the 
hypothesis that, when acting uncoordinatedly, the supermarket chose to price the bags in cities in which it had 
a relatively larger market share.  
Our results are consistent with the argument that a zero price is a special price and the findings that 
putting a small price to goods and services in education and health that were originally free of charge causes 
relatively large effects on their demand (Holla and Kremer, 2009; Banerjee and Duflo, 2009). Nevertheless, a 
permanent drop between 70% and 85% is larger than what previous studies report. A US$ 0.07 tax on all 
disposable paper and plastic bags in the city of Chicago decreased the use of these bags by 40%, in the first two 
months on the extensive margin (the proportion of customers using at least one disposable paper or plastic bag). 
On the intensive margin, the tax decreased the average number of disposable bags used per trip by 60% in the 
same period. Nevertheless, this effect is smaller and not statistically significant by the end of the first year 
(Homonoff et al., 2020). The other study with a comparable methodology that reports a quantitative estimation 
of the effect of a levy, Homonoff (2018), finds that a US$ 0.05 levy on disposable paper and plastic bags in 
Montgomery County decreased disposable bags use by over 50% in the first three months, combining the 
extensive and the intensive margin. Considering that these studies did not consider anticipation effects, actual 
differences may be higher. To discuss what may be the reasons behind the difference between the effects found 
by these studies and ours, we look at possible differences between the US and Uruguay in the other determinants 




of bag consumption. These include: (a) income (that may affect not only willingness to pay for plastic bags but 
also grocery patterns), (b) preferences (for goods and the environment), (c) the available alternatives in the 
choice set and (d) the relative cost of these alternatives. Several factors determine the size and composition of 
the choice set. Among these, a fundamental one is the completeness of the regulation. In other words, what the 
regulation covers and what not. The completeness of the regulation determines the costs of the alternatives, 
also. Other factors determining the alternative course of actions available to consumers and their relative costs 
are the market share of the supermarket and whether all stores in town price the bags or not. Below we discuss 
what role each of these factors might play in explaining the difference in the response to prices between the US 
and Uruguay. When there is no available information, we offer suggestions for future research that may inform 
on this possible role.  
The difference in households’ income between Uruguay and the US is an obvious candidate for explaining the 
large difference between the effects that similar prices had in these countries. The reason is that, as commented 
above, ceteris paribus, income determines not only the size of the choice set, but also shopping patterns, such 
as its frequency and mode of transport. The sample period in Homonoff et al. (2020) is November 2016 – March 
2018. For reference, the average household income in the city of Chicago in 2017 was USD 84,552 (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2019). In the case of Homonoff (2018), the sample period is October 2011 – April 2012. According to the 
same source, the average household income in the treated Montgomery County, Maryland, during 2011-2012 
was USD 125,397. In the same period, the average household incomes in the control Washington DC and 
Arlington County, Virginia, was USD 75,002 and USD 131,758, respectively. For reference, as we report in Table 
1, the average household income during the sample period (April 2018 – March 2019) in Uruguay was USD 21,192 
for the treated cities and USD 20,231 for the control cities. In other words, relative to the average income, a bag 
in the treated cities in Uruguay costed four times what it costed in Chicago, and eight times what it costed in 
Montgomery County. Moreover, the chain from which we get the data is a discount store chain, with an explicit 
marketing strategy based on low prices. According to the chain´s CEO (personal conversation, April 25, 2019), 
the set of their customer does not intersect with the set of customers from another chain targeting high-class 
clients. In sum, average incomes in our sampled Uruguayan cities are lower than those in the sampled US cities, 
in terms of bags purchasing power, and the customers of our sampled discount chain may belong to relatively 
lower deciles in the Uruguayan income distribution. For these reasons, the difference in incomes could be an 
important explanatory factor behind the difference in the effects of similar prices between Uruguay and the US. 
In line with this argument, Taylor and Villas-Boas (2016) find that discount chain shoppers in California may be 
more price-sensitive than shoppers at a national chain. On the other hand, Homonoff et al. (2020) did not find 
evidence of different impacts across neighborhoods with different incomes in Chicago. Similarly, we do not find 
evidence of different impacts across different neighborhoods of Montevideo and nine other towns, albeit with a 
simpler, cross-section comparison.22 Notwithstanding, the variation in average incomes within Montevideo 
 
22 To obtain this result, we first computed the average household income in the control cities for the period 2013 – 2018. In 
the case of Montevideo, we compute the average household income for each neighborhood. For this, we use data from the 
Continuous Household Survey of the National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2018). We then computed 
the average drop in bags consumption for each of 12 branches in those 9 cities and the average drop for each of the 43 
branches that the supermarket has in 27 neighborhoods of Montevideo, between February 2018 and April 2018, when all 
supermarkets in the country priced the bags UY$ 4. The average drop across neighborhoods and cities is 84%, consistent 
with our results from Table 3. This drop correlates negatively with household income. Nevertheless, this correlation is not 
statistically significant (p value = 0.685). The results of this exercise are available in the replication files for the paper. 




neighborhoods and between Uruguayan cities is much lower than the variation between US and Uruguayan 
sample cities.23  
Another important determinant of consumption choice are the individuals´ preferences. Cultural and 
institutional determinants of tastes and beliefs about consumption goods in general, or about the environment 
in particular, could also explain the differences between US and Uruguayan price elasticities of their demand for 
disposable plastic carryout bags. According to the World Values Survey, Wave 6: 2010-2014 (Inglehart et al, 
2014), people in Uruguay declared to be more environmentally friendly than in the US, in 2011. In Uruguay, 
64.2% of respondents declared that they agree with the statement “protecting the environment should be given 
priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs”. In the US, on the other hand, 37.2% 
agreed. The percentage of people that agree with the former statement in the US had increased to 50% in 2017, 
according to the seventh wave of the World Values Survey (Haerpfer et al, 2020). Unluckily, this wave was not 
conducted yet in Uruguay, so we do not know what preferences would the Uruguayans would have stated during 
our sample period. Moreover, the Director of the firm in charge of this survey in Uruguay told us that he is not 
aware of any similar question being included in any survey conducted in Uruguay since then (e-mail 
communication, December 12, 2020). Neither are we. Assuming that the differences in stated preferences 
remain, we do not have comparable information between the US and Uruguayan cities on the level of plastic 
bags consumption prior to the prices, to check whether this difference in stated preferences towards the 
environment correlates with plastic bag consumption. In addition, having the Uruguayans so strong preferences 
for the environment but at the same time reacting in the way they did to a modest price for plastic bags would 
be at odds with the findings that prices crowd out “moral sentiments” (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Bowles and 
Polania-Reyes, 2012). Therefore, we are not inclined to conclude that higher preferences for the environment in 
favor of the Uruguayan citizens is a fundamental factor explaining the difference in the effect of prices for plastic 
bags with respect to the US.  
Another determinant of the price elasticity of plastic bags is the relative cost and availability of 
substitutes. In this respect, we do not see relevant differences between the Uruguayan and US cities sampled in 
the studies. True, there are no paper bags in supermarkets in Uruguay, but in the US these were charged with 
the same price that plastic bags. Also true, in Salto and in some cities of the second wave, the supermarket chain 
gave loyal customers a reusable bag for free, before the price went into effect. However, in Montgomery County, 
for example, in addition to the price for plastic bags, some stores subsidized the use of reusable bags. In both 
cases, when comparing cities with this policy with cities without it, the evidence suggests that both policies do 
not seem to have had a significant impact. Finally, we are not aware of any difference in the availability or relative 
prices of substitutes between the US and Uruguayan cities that could explain the differences in the effect of 
similar prices between these cities. 
In sum, of the list of theoretical determinants of the demand for plastic bags, we conclude that the 
difference in average income between Uruguay and the US is the strongest candidate to explain the observed 
 
23 More specifically, the city in the 90th percentile of the distribution has an average income that is 44% higher than the city 
in the 10th percentile. In the interquartile range, the average income increases 15%. On the other hand, the average income 
in the City of Chicago is 4 times that in the Uruguayan cities of our sample, while the average income in Montgomery County 
is six times. 




differences in the effect of the prices. Bags in Uruguay costed four and eight times more than in Chicago and 
Montgomery County, respectively, relative to households' income.  
The main lessons of our study are two. First, a well-enforced price for plastic bags could have a larger 
effect on the level of consumption of these bags outside developed countries. Second, and equally important, 
the Uruguayan experience teaches that it is possible to get a very large reduction in bag use with a modest price 
despite some stores non-compliance, when targeting supermarkets with relatively large market share. This result 
is important for settings in which complete regulation is not attainable, for one or more of the reasons mentioned 
above. Incomplete environmental regulation is commonly associated with pollution leakage from regulated to 
non-regulated firms, or from jurisdictions with tighter environmental regulation to those with a weaker one, as 
in the pollution haven hypothesis (Fowlie, 2009). The Uruguayan experience teaches that incomplete 
environmental regulation could not only have large positive effects but also positive environmental leakages, if 
the regulators use instruments that are compatible with the incentives of those regulated, such as a price. 
Effectively, the Uruguayan experience is consistent with the hypothesis that under uncoordinated, unregulated 
competition, stores are locked in a Pareto-inferior, zero-price equilibrium and a regulation (or a third party such 
as a chamber of commerce) could solve the coordination problem that the stores seem to have. The regulation, 
or the agreement promoted by the third-party coordinator, albeit incomplete, may provide information about 
the profitability of pricing the bags to some stores, such as large supermarkets, which voluntarily and individually, 
may then start pricing the bags in other jurisdictions in which they have a significant share of the grocery 
market.24  
The possibility of observing a positive spatial environmental leakage when a regulator chooses a tax 
instead of a mandatory price as the policy instruments could be more limited, we hypothesize. One reason is 
that with a price the revenues of the bags sales go to the stores, while these go to the regulator in the case of a 
tax. Therefore, although a tax may still increase stores´ profits (they have to buy less bags from suppliers), their 
incentives to rollout voluntarily a price to other (unregulated) cities could be smaller. In addition, a tax applied 
to every store in a jurisdiction may provide less clear information about the profitability of being the only stores 
pricing the bags in other jurisdictions. 
Finally, a cautionary note. Although our results show that a relatively low price can cause a large drop in 
the use of plastic shopping bags, readers should not interpret this drop as a measure of the environmental effect 
of the policy. A reason for this is that a charge on disposable plastic shopping bags may increase the demand for 
plastic trash bags, a known unintended effect. As documented by Taylor (2019), the increase in the demand for 
trash bags, measured in plastic weight, may be as large as 1/3 of the drop caused by the tax on shopping bags. A 
comprehensive evaluation of the environmental impacts of a charge on disposable plastic bags should consider 
this rebound effect. Unluckily, we do not have the data to estimate the possible increase in the demand for 
plastic trash bags in this work. The effect of incomplete regulations and the mechanisms under which this effect 
works, could be fruitful areas of future research.  
 
 
24 Fowlie (2009), using a theoretical model, demonstrated that incomplete regulation of emissions in an imperfectly 
competitive industry could not necessarily reduce allocative inefficiencies if the regulation targets the more inefficient firms   
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10 Appendix  
10.1 Initiatives to reduce the consumption of plastics bags around the world 
At the national level, Germany in 1991 and Denmark in 1994 appear to be the first countries that implemented 
taxes or levies to producers of plastic bags and retail stores delivering them (Xanthos and Walker, 2017).25 
Bangladesh appears to be the first country in the world to ban thin plastic bags in 2002, after a disastrous flooding 
(UNEP, 2018). During the same year, Ireland implemented a famous levy (Convery et al., 2007). Starting with 
South Africa in 2002, several African and Asian countries introduced bans on plastic bags in the following years. 
In 2007, Botswana introduced a levy of approximately 5 cents of US dollar and Kenya one for thicker bags 
(Xanthos and Walker, 2007). South Korea (1999) led the way for pricing mechanisms in Asia, followed by several 
attempts in Taiwan (starting 2003), China (2008), Hong Kong (2009) (Nielsen et al., 2019). Several countries, cities 
and provinces around the world followed.26 In North America, six Canadian municipalities banned plastic bags 
between 2007 and 2010. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced on June 17 2019, that Canada would ban 
plastic bags in 2021.27 In the US, between 2007 and today, cities, counties and states passed 156 norms regulating 
the use of disposable single-use carryout bags.28 Of these, only 12 are levies (10 cities, Suffolk County, NY, and 
Washington DC). The rest are bans, some combined with a charge on paper bags, such as the one that recently 
(March 1st, 2020) came into effect in NYC. 
The European Union passed the Directive 2015/270 in April 2015, which requires Member States to take 
either or both of the following measures. First: ensure that the annual consumption does not exceed 90 
lightweight plastic carrier bags per person by 31 December 2019 and 40 lightweight plastic carrier bags per 
person by 31 December 2025, or equivalent targets set in weight. Second: adopt instruments ensuring that points 
of sale of goods or products do not provide lightweight plastic carrier bags free of charge by 31 December 2018, 
unless equally effective instruments are implemented (EU, 2015). In South America, the city of Buenos Aires 
established a charge for plastic bags at the end of 2012 (Jakovcevic et al., 2012) and later banned plastic bags in 
supermarkets in 2017. Chile became the first Latin American country to ban plastic bags in supermarkets by law, 
since February 2019. (See Nielsen et al. (2019) for a more comprehensive account of bans and levies across the 
world). The above list of initiatives does not cover voluntary agreements between governments and retailers to 
reduce plastic bags, private company initiatives, social awareness campaigns, waste management systems 
improvements or promotion of ecological alternatives. It does not cover, also, other regulations such as thickness 
requirements, material composition, production volume or number restrictions, extended producer 
responsibility, etc. As of July 2018, one hundred and twenty-seven (127) countries out of 192 reviewed have 
adopted some form of legislation to regulate plastic bags (United Nations Environment Programme, 2018). 
 
25 Some authors use “levy” to refer to the charge on disposable bags. Others, fee. The different names that the charge takes 
may be the result of the name it takes in the regulations. In any case, as it is customary in the literature, we use the terms 
“tax”, “levy”, “fee” and “charge” interchangeably.  
26 The site https://www.earthday.org/plasticban/ maintains an updated list of efforts of regions, countries, cities and 
businesses to ban the use of plastics bags. 
27 https://web.archive.org/web/20191018102313/https:/www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/10/canada-ban-single-
use-plastics-bags-bottles-straws-2021 
28 A US list of Plastic bags ordinances is available at https://www.cawrecycles.org/list-of-national-bans (Accessed June 6, 
2019). 




10.2 The campaign sign 
Figure A.1 shows the campaign sign that the Municipal Government and the Industrial and Commercial Center 
displayed in supermarkets and stores in Salto, during the launch of the pricing initiative, at the entrance of 
supermarkets and stores. The signs informed readers about the existence of a campaign to reduce the use of 
plastic bags in the city (“We are reducing plastic bags in Salto!”). It also informed the readers that the initiative 
was a joint effort of the municipal government and the commercial center (it included the number of the 
resolution by which the municipal government adhered to the center initiative, the logos of the two institutions, 
below the phrase “we join the initiative”). Finally, it included the campaign slogan (“We are clean. We are 
happy”). 
 
FIGURE A.1 THE CAMPAIGN SIGN IN SALTO 
 
  




10.3 The comparability of the different cities 
TABLE A.0: DIFFERENCE OF MEAN TESTS FOR TREATED AND CONTROL CITIES, SELECTED VARIABLES 
Variable Mean 
Treated 
Mean        
Not treated 
diff std. Err. p-val 
Supermarket chain data       
     Bags delivered by month in city (000) 110.71 102.44 8.27 30.26 0.79  
     Market share in city       
by area of stores (m2) 0.65 0.24 0.41 0.09 0.00 *** 
by number stores 0.56 0.29 0.28 0.09 0.01 *** 
by number of registers 0.66 0.31 0.35 0.09 0.00 *** 
     Number of stores in city 1.69 1.30 0.39 0.34 0.26  
     Largest store in town belongs to chain 0.75 0.00 0.75 0.11 0.00 *** 
Cities data        
     Western city 1.00 0.20 0.80 0.13 0.00 *** 
     Number of supermarkets in city 3.88 6.30 -2.43 1.79 0.19  
     Supermarkets area (m2) 2502 7274 -4772 2309 0.05 ** 
     Cash registers 23.00 56.60 -33.60 19.39 0.10 * 
     Population 33756 38339 -4583 7117 0.53  
     Female (%) 0.52 0.52 -0.01 0.00 0.04 ** 
     Age 36.01 36.02 -0.01 0.63 0.99  
     Children (%) 0.21 0.21 0.01 0.01 0.33  
     Married (%) 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.92  
     Retired (%) 0.22 0.20 0.02 0.01 0.21  
     Low education level (%) 0.64 0.60 0.04 0.03 0.18  
     Occupied (%) 0.60 0.62 -0.01 0.01 0.36  
     Unemployed (%) 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.86  
     Income (UY$ 2019) 57344 54744 2600 3111. 0.41  
     Below poverty line 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.38  
Cities data, excluding Montevideo       
     Supermarkets (#) 3.19 8.00 -4.81 2.96 0.12  
     Convenience Stores (#) 4.44 7.30 -2.86 3.91 0.47  
     Schools (#) 6.81 12.10 -5.29 3.62 0.16  
     Gas Stations (#) 4.50 5.10 -0.60 1.06 0.58  
     Pharmacies (#) 3.06 6.20 -3.14 2.67 0.25  
     Banks (#) 2.75 3.10 -0.35 0.74 0.64  
     Other amenities (#) 80.50 173.90 -93.40 91.65 0.32  
Notes: The table shows tests for balance between cities during the rollout of the price. Treated cities are the 16 locations where 
the supermarket chain introduced a price (US$ 2 or UY$ 3) for plastic bags, and the not-treated group consists of 10 cities where the price 
remained at zero until April 2019. Each line is from a different linear regression at the city level. We exclude the first city (Salto, with 3 
stores), and the capital city of Montevideo (with 43 stores). The number of bags delivered by month in each city is calculated for the pre-
treatment period (before April 2018). See Table 1 for an explanation of the variables and data sources.   




10.4 Figures of the wave-specific effects  
Figure A.2 shows a summary of the wave specific effects that we will analyze in detail in the next sections of this 
appendix. Table 4 in the main text shows the estimation of the drop in consumption plotted in this figure. 
Panel (a) First wave: April 2018 (Salto), 3 
branches, p = UY$ 2, treated 12 months 
 
Panel (b) Second wave: October 2018, 11 
branches, p = UY$-2, treated 6 months 
 
Panel (c) Third wave: December 2018, 3 
branches, p = UY$ 3, treated 4 months 
 
Panel (d) Fourth wave: January 2019, 12 
branches, p = UY$ 2, treated 3 months 
 
FIGURE A.2: AVERAGE NUMBER OF BAGS DELIVERED BY TREATED BRANCHES IN EACH WAVE AND 
CONTROL BRANCHES, BY MONTH 
Notes: The figure shows the wave specific effects, associated with Table 4. The red line (hollow circle) plots the monthly number 
of bags delivered by the average treated branch in the corresponding set and the green line (hollow triangle) plots the monthly number 
of bags delivered by the average branch in the set of the 56 branches that did not price the bags. The vertical line marks the beginning of 
the treatment (wave specific). Panel (a) shows the first wave (Salto). In this case, the sample period covers 12 months before and 12 
months after the price. Panel (b) shows the second wave of the pricing initiative. In this case, the post treatment period covers six months. 
Panel (c) shows the third wave. This is the only wave in which p = UY$ 3. In this case, our sample covers the first four months of the post-
treatment period. Lastly, Panel (d) shows the fourth wave. In this case, our sample covers the first three post-treatment months. 
  




10.5 Salto (April 2018) 
TABLE A.1: AVERAGE NUMBER OF BAGS DELIVERED BY BRANCHES IN SALTO (TREATED) AND 56 BRANCHES 
THAT DID NOT PRICE THE BAGS (CONTROL), BEFORE AND AFTER PRICING THE BAGS 
  Before After Difference 
Control 
64.45 75.31 10.87 
(5.18) (5.94) (1.41)*** 
Treated 
124.85 41.23 -83.62 
(11.95) (4.55) (8.70)** 
Difference 
60.41 -34.08 -94.49 
(11.12)*** (7.03)*** (7.26)*** 
Notes: The table shows the average number of bags delivered in each branch (in thousands per month), before and after the 
price, for branches in Salto and the 56 branches in the rest of the country that did not price the bags during the period. The number of 
observations for the DiD regression is 1,429. Robust standard errors clustered at the branch level in parenthesis. 
 
TABLE A.2: DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE OLS ESTIMATION 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
  Basic DiD Branch FE Month FE 
Branch + 
Month FE 
D + Time 
trends 
Treated*After -94.49*** -93.52*** -94.34*** -93.52*** -100.74*** 
 (7.26) (7.38) (7.31) (7.44) (9.32) 
Branch FE No Yes No Yes Yes 
Month FE No No Yes Yes Yes 
Time trends No No No No Yes 
N 1,429 1,429 1,429 1,429 1,429 
Notes: The table shows the OLS estimation of the diff-in-diff coefficient of the average treatment effect. The results are 
variations of equation (2). Column (A) presents de basic specification of the equation and the rest of the columns show the results with 
different combinations of branch fixed effects, month fixed effects and time trends. Column (D) presents the results from our preferred 
specification included in the main text (see column (A) of Table 4). Standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered at the branch level. Outcome 
variable: average number of bags delivered/sold by branch, by month. Sample period: 24 months between April 2017 and March 2019. 
Control group: 56 branches that did not priced the bags in the sample period. * p<0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
  




TABLE A.3: ANTICIPATION EFFECTS  
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
  Basic DiD Branch FE Month FE 
Branch + 
Month FE 
D + Time 
trends 
DiD anticipation effect 11.87*** 12.92*** 11.84*** 12.74*** 13.65*** 
(3.46) (3.43) (3.50) (3.47) (3.84) 
pct change 9.9% 10.8% 9.9% 10.6% 11.4% 
DiD price -90.51*** -89.21*** -90.40*** -89.27*** -87.03*** 
(6.86) (6.95) (6.91) (7.00) (8.29) 
pct change -75.6% -74.5% -75.5% -74.6% -72.7% 
Branch FE No Yes No Yes Yes 
Month FE No No Yes Yes Yes 
Time trends No No No No Yes 
N 1,429 1,429 1,429 1,429 1,429 
Notes: The table shows difference-in-difference estimates corresponding to equation (3) in the main text. Each column is a 
different regression. The first coefficient is the difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of the announcement of the price (four 
months before the effective implementation) on the number of consumed bags. The second coefficient is the estimate of the average 
treatment effect for the price. The results that we present in the main text (Table 7) are those of our preferred specification (column D 
from this Table). Outcome variable: number of bags delivered/sold by branch, by month. Control group: 56 branches that did not price 








10.6 Second wave – October 2018 
TABLE A.4: AVERAGE NUMBER OF BAGS DELIVERED BY BRANCHES IN THE SECOND WAVE (TREATED) AND 56 
BRANCHES THAT DID NOT PRICE THE BAGS (CONTROL), BEFORE AND AFTER THE FORMER PRICED THE BAGS 
  Before After Difference 
Control 
66.83 78.88 12.06 
(5.39) (6.06) (1.46)*** 
Treated 
67.57 21.86 -45.71 
(8.9) (2.02) (7.00)*** 
Difference 
0.74 -57.02 -57.77 
(10.10) (6.36)*** (6.88)*** 
Notes: See comments to Table A.1. In this case, the number of observations for the DiD regression is 1,621.  
 
TABLE A.5: DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE OLS ESTIMATION 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
  Basic DiD Branch FE Month FE 
Branch + 
Month FE 
D + Time 
trends 
Treated*After -57.77*** -57.18*** -57.66*** -57.20*** -59.20*** 
 (6.88) (7.01) (6.92) (7.06) (8.53) 
Branch FE No Yes No Yes Yes 
Month FE No No Yes Yes Yes 
Time trends No No No No Yes 
N 1,621 1,621 1,621 1,621 1,621 
Notes: See comments to Table A.2 
TABLE A.6: ANTICIPATION EFFECTS  
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
  Basic DiD Branch FE Month FE 
Branch + 
Month FE 
D + Time 
trends 
DiD anticipation effect -3.39* -2.58 -3.22 -2.55 -7.98** 
(2.00) (1.96) (1.99) (1.98) (3.83) 
pct change -5.1% -3.9% -4.8% -3.8% -12.0% 
DiD price -58.49*** -57.75*** -58.37*** -57.77*** -66.32*** 
(6.87) (6.99) (6.91) (7.04) (10.35) 
pct change -87.9% -86.8% -87.7% -86.8% -99.6% 
Branch FE No Yes No Yes Yes 
Month FE No No Yes Yes Yes 
Time trends No No No No Yes 
N 1,621 1,621 1,621 1,621 1,621 
Notes: See comments to Table A.3 




10.7 Third wave – December 2018 
TABLE A.7: AVERAGE NUMBER OF BAGS DELIVERED BY TREATED AND CONTROL BRANCHES, BEFORE AND 
AFTER PRICING THE BAGS 
  Before After Difference 
Control 
67.90 79.46 11.55 
(5.43) (6.21) (1.82)*** 
Treated 
49.93 20.53 -29.39 
(12.07) (4.63) (8.29)*    
Difference 
-17.98 -58.92 -40.95 
(11.33) (7.30)*** (7.02)*** 
Notes: See comments to Table A.1. In this case, the number of observations for the DiD regression is 1,428.  
TABLE A.8: DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE OLS ESTIMATION 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
  Basic DiD Branch FE Month FE 
Branch + 
Month FE 
D + Time 
trends 
Treated*After -40.95*** -40.61*** -40.62*** -40.45*** -51.28*** 
 (7.02) (7.07) (7.02) (7.08) (12.22) 
Branch FE No Yes No Yes Yes 
Month FE No No Yes Yes Yes 
Time trends No No No No Yes 
N 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 
Notes: See comments to Table A.2 
TABLE A.9: ANTICIPATION EFFECTS  
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
  Basic DiD Branch FE Month FE 
Branch + 
Month FE 
D + Time 
trends 
DiD anticipation effect 16.25*** 16.73*** 16.65*** 16.97*** 15.61 
(3.49) (3.37) (3.58) (3.45) (11.60) 
pct change 36.1% 37.2% 37.0% 37.7% 34.7% 
DiD price -37.59*** -37.17*** -37.24*** -37.00*** -39.03* 
(7.46) (7.49) (7.46) (7.50) (20.91) 
pct change -83.5% -82.6% -82.7% -82.2% -86.7% 
Branch FE No Yes No Yes Yes 
Month FE No No Yes Yes Yes 
Time trends No No No No Yes 
N 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 
Notes: See comments to Table A.3 
  




10.8 Fourth wave – January 2019 
TABLE A.10: AVERAGE NUMBER OF BAGS DELIVERED BY BRANCHES IN THE SECOND WAVE (TREATED) AND 56 
BRANCHES THAT DID NOT PRICE THE BAGS (CONTROL), BEFORE AND AFTER THE FORMER PRICED THE BAGS 
  Before After Difference 
Control 
69.27 73.64 4.37 
(5.51) (5.93) (2.08)** 
Treated 
76.52 26.29 -50.23 
(12.16) (4.05) (8.38)*** 
Difference 
7.25 -47.35 -54.60 
(12.96)    (7.11)*** (8.33)*** 
Notes: See comments to Table A.1. In this case the number of observations for the DiD regression is 1,644.  
TABLE A.11: EFFECT OF A PRICE OF US$ 0.07 ON THE QUANTITY DEMANDED OF SINGLE-USE PLASTIC BAGS 
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE OLS ESTIMATION 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
  Basic DiD Branch FE Month FE 
Branch + 
Month FE 
D + Time 
trends 
Treated*After -54.60*** -53.99*** -54.46*** -53.98*** -48.86*** 
 (8.33) (8.47) (8.39) (8.54) (9.76) 
Branch FE No Yes No Yes Yes 
Month FE No No Yes Yes Yes 
Time trends No No No No Yes 
N 1,644 1,644 1,644 1,644 1,644 
Notes: See comments to Table A.2 
TABLE A.12: ANTICIPATION EFFECTS  
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
  Basic DiD Branch FE Month FE 
Branch + 
Month FE 
D + Time 
trends 
DiD anticipation effect -1.35 -0.55 -1.14 -0.47 7.61 
(3.95) (4.00) (3.97) (4.03) (5.50) 
pct change -1.8% -0.7% -1.5% -0.6% 10.2% 
DiD price -54.82*** -54.08*** -54.67*** -54.07*** -43.37*** 
(8.39) (8.52) (8.45) (8.59) (11.02) 
pct change -73.5% -72.5% -73.3% -72.5% -58.2% 
Branch FE No Yes No Yes Yes 
Month FE No No Yes Yes Yes 
Time trends No No No No Yes 
N 1,644 1,644 1,644 1,644 1,644 
Notes: See comments to Table A.3  




10.9 DiD decomposition 
 
 
FIGURE A.3: GOODMAN-BACON DECOMPOSITION 
Notes: The figure shows the estimates from the Stata bacondecomp package (Goodman-Bacon, Goldring, and Nichols 2019). The 
horizontal red line shows the average difference in difference estimation of the drop in bags consumption after charging. The DiD 
coefficient is an average of all the 2x2 comparisons. We confirm that the estimate of the average effect of the price for the full experiment 
is mainly determined by the comparison of each individual wave against the never treated stores. The October wave of the experiment is 
the one which has the largest weight on the overall DiD estimate.  
  




10.10 Leave-one-out synthetic controls 
 
Panel (a) First wave: April 2018 (Salto), 3 
branches, p = UY$ 2, treated 12 months 
 
Panel (b) Second wave: October 2018, 11 
branches, p = UY$ 2, treated 6 months 
 
Panel (c) Third wave: December 2018, 3 
branches, p = UY$ 3, treated 4 months 
 
Panel (d) Fourth wave: January 2019, 12 
branches, p = UY$ 2, treated 3 months 
 
FIGURE A.4: AVERAGE NUMBER OF BAGS DELIVERED BY TREATED BRANCHES IN EACH WAVE (RED LINE) ITS 
SYNTHETIC CONTROL (GREEN LINE), AND THE LEAVE-ONE-OUT SYNTHETICS (GREY LINES), BY MONTH 
Notes: These figures show the robustness of the synthetic control to leaving out from the donor pool one branch at a time. 
These synthetic controls are plotted in grey, while the synthetic control constructed with all the observations is plotted in green and 
corresponds to the synthetic of the figures in the main text. Treated branches averages in each wave are plotted in red. The y-axis shows 
average monthly bags consumption per store, in thousands.  
 
